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Synopsis 
 
Understanding relationships between important events separated in time and space can be 
achieved by two possible ways: associative learning and causality. Associative learning is the 
cognitively less demanding approach because it depends on an organism experiencing many 
repetitions of two events in close spatial and temporal contiguity. When cause and effect are 
separated in space or time, associative learning loses its functionality. 
 Understanding causality is a cognitively higher-level mechanism as: it requires the 
individual to understand how the antecedent event A (the cause) produces the consequent 
event B (the effect) through some mediating force that explains why the first invariably leads 
to the second. Causal understanding is a priori and leads to a flexible approach to problem 
solving in the physical realm, because individuals may substitute antecedent events in 
initiating the same mediating force or prevent consequent events by blocking the 
antecedent´s initiation. Thus, causality allows individuals to transfer what they have learned 
in one task to a novel one based on the same principles, whereas associative learning results 
in the formation of a task-specific solution. 
 Knowledge about physical causality – defined as the way that objects behave and 
interact – is a central issue in cognitive development (Haith & Benson, 1988; Piaget, 1952; 
1954; Spelke & Newport, 1998). Most of the early research on young children´s 
understanding of causality was highly descriptive, and children´s verbal explanations of real 
or hypothetical events were used to highlight the differences in causal understanding 
between children and adults (e.g. Piaget, 1930). More recent studies, using the 'violation of 
expectancy' technique, reveal that even infants as young as six months are sensitive to 
causal relations (Leslie, 1982; Leslie & Keeble, 1987; Oakes & Cohen, 1990). The used 
experimental techniques rely on the amount of time infants spend looking at a certain event. 
After infants are familiarized with an event sequence, they are presented with two test 
trials, one that obeys the laws of physics (possible) and others that violate these laws 
(impossible). Infants’ looking at the two test events is then measured. The relevant issue is 
whether infants will increase their looking times when there is a change of the event from 
possible to impossible or vice versa. If there is a difference, and it is the impossible event 
that infants look at longer, it is taken as evidence that they have detected the impossibility 
of the event sequence. Research using these methods has demonstrated that infants were 
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sensitive to properties of the physical world that were previously assumed to be far beyond 
their understanding (e.g. Baillargéon & Hanko-Summers, 1990; Spelke, 1988; 1990; 1991). 
These methods, however, are hotly contested (see Karmiloff-Smith, 1992) and remain an 
important issue. 
The degree to which animals understand physical principles is a matter of contention. 
Researchers have tried, for many decades, to get a glimpse into the folk physics of animals, 
i.e. their common sense understanding of how the world works, as well as why it works in 
the way it does (e.g. Köhler, 1925; Povinelli, 2000; Tomasello & Call, 1997). Concerning 
primates in particular, several studies have suggested the use of various cognitive strategies 
in understanding such things as space, tools, object categories and quantities. However, 
relatively little is known about nonhuman primates´ understanding of the underlying causal 
mechanisms. To date, what we know about primates’ causal understanding is almost 
exclusively restricted to the context of tool use (see Bard et al. 1995; Limongelli et al. 1995; 
Hauser, 1997; Natale, 1989; Spinozzi & Potí, 1989; 1993; Visalberghi & Limongelli, 1994; 
Visalberghi & Trinca, 1989; Visalberghi et al. 1995; Povinelli, 2000). Surprisingly little effort 
has been made to experimentally determine what exactly these animals understand about 
the causal mechanisms involved in these interactions. 
Causality is the cognitive basis for acquiring and using physical concepts. Some 
researchers (Penn & Povinelli, 2007; Vonk & Povinelli, 2006; Povinelli, 2004) argued that only 
humans possess the capability to reason about physical concepts such as gravity, force or 
weight that refer to unobservable entities. Povinelli (2004) stated that reasoning about 
weight is beyond the scope of chimpanzees’ abilities, as it requires the human language to 
connect perception of weight with a concept of weight. In his opinion the weight concept is 
a theoretical construct that cannot be detected visually (i.e. because it is unobservable) and, 
in contrast to human adults and children, chimpanzees rely strictly upon observable 
features. 
It is true that, in contrast to the wealth of knowledge available on the use of visual 
information in primates, we know little about their use of other sensory modalities. This is 
especially true of their kinesthetic abilities, in particular their ability to discriminate weight. 
To date, only two studies have been published on this topic. McCulloch (1941) trained five 
chimpanzees to select the heavier of two boxes. Despite the large weight differences (80 vs 
480 g or 80 vs. 640 g), the chimpanzees needed a median of 1100 trials to master the task.  
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Klüver (1933) also conducted weight discrimination experiments with monkeys. 
Subjects were presented with two boxes differing in weight (450 vs 150 g) and were required 
to compare the weights and select the correct alternative: some subjects needed to select 
the heavier box, others the lighter box. Subjects needed hundreds of trials to reach criterion, 
even though the weight differences between quantities were considerable. The large 
number of trials needed seems to indicate that subjects had difficulty encoding weight cues. 
Nonetheless, note that McCulloch´s (1941) and Klüver´s (1933) study are both based on 
solving an arbitrary relation and not a causal one, the correct solution being decided by the 
experimenter. Thus, there was actually no a priori reason for the tested subjects why the 
heavy or light object should be correct. It is possible that subjects would more easily learn to 
use weight information when weight is causally related to solving the task.  
Children’s understanding of weight is initially grounded in their perceptual sensation 
of felt weight rather than in a property of matter (Piaget & Inhelder, 1974). Although even 
preschool children understand that objects vary in weight, their initial concept of weight is 
the felt pressure of objects on their hands and the effort they have to exert to hold things or 
to make them move. For instance, more than half of 4-year-olds, and half of 6-year-olds, 
judged that a small rice corn or a piece of styrofoam weighs nothing at all (Smith, Carey, 
Wiser, 1985). Children at this age also judge that two visibly different-sized clay balls weigh 
the same because they both feel light, rather than thinking their weight must differ because 
they posses different amounts of matter. Thus, younger children’s concept of weight is 
highly influenced by the felt weight of an object, and their reliance on “felt weight” 
encourages size and density intrusions on weight judgments. Size intrusions on weight 
judgments are evident in the young child´s thinking that relative size is a reliable indicator of 
weight. Children at this stage assume that popcorn becomes heavier when it is popped 
because it got bigger (Piaget & Inhelder, 1974). They will also predict that a wax and clay ball 
will weigh the same if they were made the same size.  
According to Smith et al. (1985), it is around 9-years of age that children develop a 
concept of weight that is less dependent on their perceptual sensations. While young 
children at ages 3 to 4 have early theories that contain concepts of weight and size (but 
totally lack the concept of density), at ages 5 to 7 their concept of weight becomes modified. 
At this point they can be considered to have an undifferentiated weight/density concept. 
The change in the child´s concept of weight is indicated by the ability to regard weight 
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differences as important in distinguishing whether objects are made of the same material. 
Finally, 8- to 9-year-old children reach the point where they not only have distinct density 
and weight concepts, but also reconceptualize matter as the underlying constituent of 
objects. Such children assert that everything must weigh something, no matter how small it 
is, and judge that a small piece of clay is still heavier than a piece of play dough the same 
size.  
Smith et al. (1985) also claim that 3- to- 4-year-olds consider weight as a physical 
property of objects which causally affects that object's interactions with other objects. This 
is indicated by their belief that a heavy object will make a foam rubber bridge collapse. The 
transition from felt weight to weight as a property of matter has been studied in the frame 
of the balance-scale paradigm (Metz 1993). The literature typically assumes that children´s 
initial representation of the elements on the balance-scale is framed in terms of weight (e.g. 
Case 1985; Siegler, 1978). In the experimental procedure on which these conclusions are 
based, however, an unequal number of identical elements is placed on each end of the scale 
to achieve differences in weight, rather than presenting visually identical heavy and light 
objects. Thus, the number prediction pattern is confounded with the weight prediction 
pattern. It remains open whether younger children understand the relevance of weight to 
the balance-scale problem, i.e. that heaviness causes the scale to tip. 
In the course of my PhD, I investigated great apes´ and 3- to -4-year-old children’s 
understanding of weight as a non-visual-based object property and whether they are 
genuinely able to reason about weight. To do so, I tested chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes), 
bonobos (Pan paniscus), gorillas (Gorilla gorilla gorilla) and orangutans (Pongo pygmaeus 
abelii) housed at the Wolfgang Köhler Primate Research Centre, Leipzig Zoo (Germany). The 
children were tested at the University of Heidelberg, Institute of Psychology. 
The first experiment was designed to evaluate how bonobos, gorillas and orangutans 
perform in a weight discrimination task. To test for a possible superiority of one sensory 
modality, a second condition, based on visual discrimination (achromatic color), was 
included as a control. In order to avoid training the subjects to pay attention to the 
kinesthetic cue, I used the exchange paradigm as the method of choice. In the exchange 
task, subjects have to give objects to the experimenter to get rewarded; lifting the objects 
(perceiving the kinesthetic cue) was therefore an integral part of the procedure. This 
methodology also allowed a direct comparison between visual and weight discrimination. 
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Twelve subjects (5 bonobos, 2 gorillas and 5 orangutans) were presented with two sets of 
objects corresponding to two conditions. The objects in the achromatic color condition 
(white/black) differed only in color, and those in the weight condition (light/heavy) differed 
only in weight. Five apes learned to discriminate weight and six to discriminate color. 
Subjects learned color discrimination faster than weight discrimination. The results suggest 
that bonobos and orangutans are sensitive to differences in weight and are able to learn to 
discriminate objects that differ in this property. 
Based on these findings, I conducted a second experiment to assess whether subjects 
would be able to use weight information in a situation in which weight is causally related to 
solving the task. In particular, I presented apes, which had already participated in the weight 
exchange experiment, with two opaque cups and hid slices of two bananas in one of them. 
Subjects had the possibility to lift both cups before making a choice. The aim of the study 
was to test whether great apes would independently gain kinesthetic information about cup 
weight and then consequentially select the heavier one, i.e. the one containing the banana 
slices. To rule out that good performance was influenced by previous experience in weight 
experiments or by the large amount of food they received as reward, I presented the same 
task to a group of chimpanzees that were naïve to weight experiments. These subjects also 
participated in an additional test condition in which the same problem was presented but 
based on learning to associate arbitrary visual stimuli. Specifically, cups of the same weight 
but different visual appearance were presented. Subjects had to learn to associate a specific 
visual pattern as an indicator for the location of the reward. Hence, I presented chimpanzees 
with two task stimuli: one held a causal relation (i.e. perceived weight indicates the hidden 
food), the other an arbitrary relation (i.e. certain visual pattern indicates food), with the 
contingencies of reinforcement being the same. The results show that experience did not 
affect performance because the nine naïve subjects were equally able to find the food in the 
causal condition, i.e. food inside the cup generated heaviness. Interestingly, only one of the 
naïve subjects solved the task in the arbitrary condition. Our results confirm previous 
findings (Call 2004; 2006a, b; 2007; Hanus and Call 2008) that apes perform better in 
problems grounded on causal compared to arbitrary relations.  
Finally, I investigated whether 3- to -4-year-old children are able to correctly encode 
the relevance of weight in influencing the behavior of a balance-scale. I studied how well 3- 
to 4-year-old children learn to use one of two different weights (of equal appearance) to tip 
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the scale. In one condition (possible), the heavy weight produced the desired outcome; in 
the other condition (impossible), the light weight caused the scale to tip. Only 4-year-olds 
learned more effectively in the possible versus impossible condition, suggesting that children 
younger than 4 have not yet developed clear expectations of the role of weights on the 
movements of a balance-scale. 
In summary, I found that apes are able to discriminate weight and can quickly learn 
to use weight information in a situation in which weight is causally related to solving a task. 
In contrast to Povinelli´s (2004) claims, the human language does not seem to be essential to 
reason about weight. Although I have not tested explicitly for the prerequisites for 
successfully completing the presented tasks my experiments suggest that it is not the human 
language that allows to reason about unobservable entities. Chimpanzees and other apes do 
not rely strictly on observable features. In contrast, performance seemed to depend on 
whether the task was presented in a causal compared to an arbitrary context. In children, 
performance seemed to be age dependent because only the 4-year-olds showed a 
difference in learning between the condition that obeyed the laws of physics and the 
condition that violated these laws. 
7 
References 
Baillargéon R, Hanko-Summers S (1990) Is the object adequately supported by the bottom 
object? Young infants´ understanding of support relations. Child Development 5, 29-54 
 
Bard KA, Fragaszy D, Visalberghi E (1995) Acquisition and comprehension of tool-using 
behavior by young chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes): effects of age and modeling. International 
Journal of Comparative Psychology 8, 1-22 
 
Call J (2004) Inferences about the location of food in the Great Apes (Pan paniscus, Pan 
troglodytes, Gorilla gorilla, and Pongo Pygmaeus). Journal of Comparative Psychology 115, 
159-171 
 
Call J (2006a) Descartes´ two errors: Reason and reflection in the great apes. In: Hurley S, 
Nudds M (eds) Rational animals (pp.219-234). Oxford: Oxford University Press 
 
Call J (2006b) Inferences by exclusion in the great apes: the effect of age and species. Animal 
Cognition 9:393-403 
 
Call J (2007) Apes know that hidden objects can afford the orientation of other objects. 
Cognition 105: 1-25 
 
Case R (1985) Intellectual development: Birth to adulthood. New York: Academic Press 
 
Haith MM, Benson J (1988) Infant cognition. In: Kuhn D, Siegler RS (eds) Handbook of Child 
Psychology. Vol 1: Cognition, perception and language (pp. 199-254). New York: Wiley 
 
Hanus D, Call J (2008) Chimpanzees infer the location of a reward based on the effect of its 
weight. Current Biology 18, R370-R372 
 
Hauser MD (1997) Artifactual kinds and functional design features: What a primate 
understands without language. Cognition 64, 285-308 
8 
Karmiloff-Smith A (1992) Beyond modularity. A developmental perspective on cognitive 
science. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press 
 
Klüver H (1933) Behavior mechanisms in monkeys. Chicago University Press, Chicago 
 
Köhler W (1925) The Mentality of Apes. New York: Liveright 
 
Kremers J (2005) The primate visual system: A comparative approach. John Wiley and Sons 
 
Leslie AM (1982) The perception of causality in infants. Perception 11, 173-186 
 
Leslie AM, Keeble S (1987) Do six-month-old infants perceive causality? Cognition 25, 265-
288 
 
Limongelli L, Boysen ST, Visalberghi E (1995) Comprehension of cause-effect relations in a 
tool-using task by chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes). Journal of Comparative Psychology 109, 
18-26 
 
McCulloch T (1941) Discrimination of lifted weights by chimpanzees. Journal of Comparative 
Psychology 32, 507-519 
 
Metz KE (1993) Preschoolers´ Developing Knowledge of the Pan Balance: From New 
Representation to Transformed Problem Solving. Cognition and Instruction 11, 31-93 
 
Natale F (1989) Causality II. The stick problem. In: Antinucci F (Ed) Cognitive structure and 
development in nonhuman primates (pp 121-133). Erlbaum, Hillsdale, NJ 
 
Oakes LM, Cohen LB (1990) Infant perception of a causal event. Cognitive Development 5, 
193-207 
 
Penn D, Povinelli D (2007) Causal cognition in human and nonhuman animals: A 
comparative, critical review. Annual Review of Psychology 58, 97-118 
9 
Piaget J (1930) The child´s concept of physical causality. London, K. Paul, Trench, Trubner & 
Co 
 
Piaget J (1952) The origins of intelligence in children. New York: International University 
Press 
 
Piaget J (1954) The construction of reality in the child. Ballantine Books, New York 
 
Piaget J, Inhelder B (1974) The child’s construction of quantities. London: Routledge and 
Kegan Paul 
 
Povinelli D (2000) Folk Physics for Apes, Oxford, Oxford University Press 
 
Povinelli D (2004) Behind the ape´s appearance: escaping anthropocentrism in the study of 
other minds. Daedalus Winter Vol, 133, No.1: 29-41  
 
Siegler RS (1978) Children´s thinking: What develops? Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum 
Associates Inc 
 
Smith C, Carey S, Wiser M (1985) On differentiation: a case study of the development of the 
concepts of size, weight and density. Cognition 21, 177-237 
 
Spelke ES (1988) The origins of physical knowledge. In: Weiskrantz L (Ed) Thought without 
language. Oxford, UK: Oxford Press 
 
Spelke ES (1990) Principles of object perception. Cognitive Science 14, 29-56  
 
Spelke ES (1991) Physical knowledge in infancy: Reflections on Piaget´s theory. In: Carey S, 
Gelman R (eds) The epigenesis of mind: Essays on biology and cognition (pp 133-169). 
Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates Inc 
 
10 
Spelke ES, Newport EL (1998) Nativism, empiricism and the development of knowledge. In: 
Learner RE (Ed) Handbook of child psychology: Theoretical models of human development. 
Vol 1, New York: Wiley 
 
Spinozzi G, Potí P (1989) Causality I: The support problem. In: Antinucci F (Ed) Cognitive 
structure and development in nonhuman primates (pp 113-119). Erlbaum, Hillsdale, NJ 
 
Spinozzi G, Potí P (1993) Piagetian stage 5 in two infant chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes): the 
development of permanence of objects and the spatialization of causality. International 
Journal of Primatology 14, 905-917 
 
Tomasello M, Call J (1997) Primate cognition. Oxford University Press, Oxford  
 
Visalberghi E, Trinca L (1989) Tool use in capuchin monkeys: distinguishing between 
performing and understanding. Primates 30, 511-521 
 
Visalberghi E, Limongelli L (1994) Lack of comprehension of cause-effect relations in tool-
using capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella). Journal of Comparative Psychology 108, 15-22  
 
Visalberghi E, Fragaszy DM,  Savage-Rumbaugh S (1995) Performance in a tool-using task by 
common chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes), bonobos (Pan paniscus), an orangutan (Pongo 
pygmaeus), and capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella). Journal of Comparative Psychology 109, 
52-60 
 
Vonk J,  Povinelli DJ (2006) Similarity and difference in the conceptual systems of primates: 
The unobservability hypothesis. In: Wasserman E, Zentall T (eds) Comparative Cognition: 
Experimental Explorations of Animal Intelligence (pp 363-387). Oxford University Press.  
11 
Great apes` performance in discriminating weight and achromatic color 
 
Cornelia Schrauf1, Josep Call2 
 
1 University of Vienna, Department of Cognitive Biology 
2 Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Anthropology, Leipzig 
 
 
Published in: 
Animal Cognition (2009) 12, 567-574 
 
 
 
 
 
12 
Abstract 
Much work has been done on visual discrimination in primates over the past decade. In 
contrast, very little is known about the relevance of non-visual information in discrimination 
learning. We investigated weight and achromatic color (color, henceforth) discrimination in 
bonobos, gorillas and orangutans, using the exchange paradigm in which subjects have to 
give objects to the experimenter in order to receive a reward. Unlike previous studies, 
subjects were not trained to lift objects because lifting the objects was an integral part of the 
exchange procedure. This methodology also allowed us a direct comparison between visual 
and weight discrimination. We presented 12 subjects (5 bonobos, 2 gorillas and 5 
orangutans) with two sets of objects corresponding to two conditions. The objects in the 
color condition (white/black) differed only in color and those in the weight condition 
(light/heavy) differed only in weight. Five apes learned to discriminate weight and six to 
discriminate color. Subjects learned color discrimination faster than weight discrimination. 
Our results suggest that bonobos and orangutans are sensitive to differences in weight and 
able to learn discriminating objects that differ in this property.   
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Introduction 
Foraging efficiently depends to a great extent on the ability to acquire and process 
information about environmental stimuli. The senses are a main way to acquire this 
information to make efficient foraging decisions (Gibson 1966, 1979; Gibson KR 1986). 
Moreover, repeated exposure to the same stimuli and their consequences foster learning, 
which in turn, increase the probability of making optimal foraging decisions. 
Primates have traditionally been considered to be primarily visually oriented animals 
(Fobes and King 1982), relying on their highly developed visual system to optimize their 
foraging efficiency and avoid toxic substances. However, the olfactory, auditory and 
proprioceptory senses also play an important role in acquiring relevant information for food 
selection (Dominy et al. 2001). This seems particularly important considering that a variety 
of plants and fruits change color or other visual features only a little if at all, during ripening 
or maturation (Nagy et al. 1980; Gautier-Hion et al. 1985). In fact, in some primate species 
vision plays only a secondary role in food acquisition. For example, the aye-aye finger taps 
wood with its finger to produce auditory information in order to locate cavities under the 
surface (Erickson 1991). Wild-tufted capuchin monkeys locate frogs hiding inside the guadue 
plant by listening for particular sounds (Izawa 1978). Nut-cracking chimpanzees and 
capuchin monkeys have to rely on non-visual cues (smell, weight, sound) in order to assess 
the state of a nut, because the protective shell prevents visual assessment of its contents 
(for a more detailed description, see Visalberghi and Néel 2003). As cracking open a nut is a 
costly behavior, both in terms of time and energy, it seems worthwhile to open a nut only 
when it contains the energy-rich kernel inside and not when the kernel has dried (Boesch 
and Boesch 1983; Boinski et al. 2003). Therefore, it seems reasonable to assume that 
primates would use a variety of sensory modalities to evaluate and learn about potential 
food sources.  
We know a fair amount about vision as a way to identify stimuli associated with food.  
Visual acuity and color perception are well developed in primates (Spence 1934; Grether 
1940 a, b; Tigges 1963; Tigges and Tigges 1965; Davis and Markowitz 1978; Barbiers 1985; 
Vonk 2003; Buchanan-Smith 2005). 
Furthermore, numerous studies have investigated visual discrimination learning in 
primates using cues such as color, brightness, shape and size (Jarvik 1953; Fobes and King 
1982; Rumbaugh and Pate 1984). Naïve individuals typically require dozens of trials to 
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associate a particular object with the presence of a reward, although other studies show that 
individuals can detect the presence of novel objects in their enclosure quite readily (Menzel 
and Juno 1982). Additionally, most studies investigating problem solving of various types 
(e.g., tool-use, inferences, computerized tasks) have relied on the use of visual information 
(Tomasello and Call 1997; Matsuzawa et al. 2006). Even those studies that have investigated 
whether individuals can make inferences about food location based on the notion of weight 
have relied on visual information to present the task (Hanus and Call 2008).  
In contrast to the wealth of knowledge available on the use of visual information in 
primates, we know much less about the use of other sensory modalities. This is especially 
true of their kinesthetic abilities, for instance, with regard to weight discrimination.  To the 
best of our knowledge, there are only two published studies in this area. McCulloch (1941) 
trained five chimpanzees to select the heavier of two boxes. Despite the large weight 
differences (80 vs. 480g or 80 vs. 640g), the chimpanzees needed a median of 1,100 trials to 
master the task. Once the subjects were successful in their performance, the weight of the 
heavier box was decreased. The smallest weight difference that the chimpanzees were able 
to discriminate between was 4 g (80 vs. 84g). 
Klüver (1933) also conducted weight discrimination experiments with monkeys.  
Subjects were presented with two boxes differing in weight (450 vs. 150g) and were required 
to compare their weights and select the correct alternative:  some subjects needed to select 
the heavier box while others were required to select the lighter box.  Long-tailed macaques 
and spider monkeys took a median of 586 and 330 trials, respectively, to reach an errorless 
performance whereas a capuchin monkey required 321 trials.  Moreover, species varied in 
the weight difference between quantities that they required in order to see signs of 
successful discrimination (long-tailed macaques: 750g; spider monkeys: 900g; capuchin 
monkey: 600g). Thus, these two studies indicate that subjects of various species are able to 
discriminate weight, but it took them hundreds of trials to reach criterion even though there 
were considerable weight differences between quantities. 
One might conclude, based on this evidence, that visual discrimination is easier than 
weight discrimination, thus reinforcing the idea of a visual-sensory primacy in monkeys and 
apes. However, caution is warranted when comparing experiments on visual and weight 
discrimination because they used different methods. Additionally, only a total of 11 
individuals (belonging to 4 different species) have been tested on weight discrimination 
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compared to hundreds of individuals from dozens of species that have been tested on visual 
discrimination.  It is, therefore, essential to study the use of non-visual information to get a 
more balanced view of discrimination learning with non-visual stimuli. Such information can 
be used to design more complex problem-solving tasks that do not rely solely on visual input 
(e.g., Povinelli and Dunphy-Lelii 2001) and to gain some insights about the use of weight to 
assess the suitability of stone hammers to crack open nuts (Boesch and Boesch 1983; 
Visalberghi et al. 2007; Schrauf et al. 2008). 
The aim of the current study was to evaluate how great apes, other than 
chimpanzees, perform in a weight discrimination task. To date nothing is known about the 
ability of gorillas, orangutans and bonobos to use weight information.  For this purpose, we 
employed a method in which, unlike previous studies (Klüver 1933; McCulloch 1941; Schrauf 
et al. 2008), subjects lifted the objects spontaneously, without the need to offer an incentive 
to do so. Furthermore, the methodology used here allowed us to directly compare visual 
discrimination in the form of an achromatic color (color, henceforth) discrimination task.  
This means that we were able to assess the putative superiority of visual over kinesthetic 
information. Additionally, the inclusion of this visual discrimination task served as a control 
for the procedure because we expected that subjects would be able to solve at least the 
color discrimination task within the allocated number of trials.  
Method 
Subjects 
 Five orangutans (Pongo pygmaeus abelii), three gorillas (Gorilla gorilla gorilla) and 
five bonobos (Pan paniscus) housed at the Wolfgang Köhler Primate Research Centre, Leipzig 
Zoo (Germany) participated in this study. There were 8 females and 4 males with ages 
ranging from 11 to 33 years (for a more detailed description, please refer to Table 1).  All 
subjects lived in social groups of various sizes in indoor and outdoor compounds. Prior to this 
study, subjects had participated in a number of cognitive experiments including visual 
discrimination of shape, size, and color (e.g., Vlamings et al. 2006) but had never been tested 
on weight discrimination. The selection of subjects was based on their preexisting 
experience in exchanging objects for rewards with a human experimenter (see Pele et al. 
2009), which represented an integral part of our current procedure. During the experiment, 
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the subjects were separated from their group members and individually tested in their 
indoor cages.  
Materials 
 Subjects were presented with two sets of objects. For the weight discrimination 
condition, we used 12 grey PVC cylinders (9.5 cm x 4 cm) of identical outward appearance. 
Six of the cylinders were filled with lead shot, weighing a total of 400g. The other remaining 
six were empty, and each weighed 100g. A transparent silicone paste was added to 
incorporate the contents in a solid and homogenous mass, preventing any rattling noise 
during manipulations and evenly distributing the weight throughout the tool. For the color 
condition, we presented 12 colored PVC rectangles (8 cm x 3.5 cm x 1.5 cm). Six of the 
rectangles were black and the remaining six were white. The objects were placed inside the 
subjects´ cage in alternate order (see Fig. 1). A blue and a white bowl were placed in front of 
the cage on the ground. We used grapes as rewards for all the subjects except Bimbo, a male 
orangutan, who received monkey chow instead.  
------------ 
Figure 1  
------------ 
Procedure 
 The experiment was conducted within the framework of the exchange paradigm 
(Hyatt and Hopkins 1998) in which subjects had to exchange objects with a human 
experimenter. In our study, the apes had to return objects with a certain feature to the 
experimenter to obtain a food reward. The advantage of the exchange paradigm was that 
the act which was needed in order to assess the critical property (lifting of the object) was a 
part of the procedure. In particular, giving the experimenter the objects that were placed 
inside the subjects’ cage necessarily involved lifting them prior to the exchange. Thus neither 
an incentive nor training was needed for the subjects to lift the objects in order to perceive 
kinesthetic cues. 
 Before the apes entered the testing room the objects were positioned inside the 
subjects’ cage on a ledge by one of the research panels (see Fig. 1). The experimenter was 
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sitting outside the cage facing the subject. To exclude inadvertent cueing while the subject 
was selecting the objects, an opaque panel prevented the experimenter from seeing the 
subjects. Only after the subject had handed the selected item to the experimenter, and thus 
had already made its choice, the experimenter could see or feel if it was the correct one. 
This means that apes could not receive experimenter-given cues regarding the objects’ 
value. Below the opaque panel, a wire mesh divider allowed the exchange of objects for 
rewards between the experimenter and the subject. The experimenter requested an item by 
extending her hand, palm-up (begging gesture), in front of the wire mesh.  If the subject 
returned a correct item, the experimenter dropped it in the white bowl on her right and 
gave a reward to the subject. If the subject returned an incorrect object the experimenter 
dropped it in the blue bowl on her left and gave no reward. 
 Subjects were presented with two sets of objects corresponding to two conditions. In 
the color condition (white/black) the items differed only in achromatic color; in the weight 
condition (heavy/light) they differed only in weight. Prior to testing, we decided which 
feature (black or white; heavy or light) would be regarded to be correct for each subject. 
This selection was done arbitrarily e.g., there was no obvious reason for the apes why black 
or white (heavy or light) should be correct and counterbalanced across subjects. 
 Each subject received two sessions per day. A session lasted until all six correct 
objects had been returned to the experimenter. Everyday after the first session, the ape was 
moved to an adjacent cage to allow the experimenter to reposition the objects for the 
following session. Subjects were tested until they either reached the criterion for errorless 
performance (see below) or had received 36 sessions. 
Data scoring and analysis 
 We videotaped all the trials and scored them live on a check-sheet. We used the 
videotapes to verify the original scoring. We coded the identity of the objects returned by 
the subjects. The criterion for successful performance consisted of returning all six correct 
objects in their first six attempts during a given session (errorless performance). As the 
probability for such a result to occur when the objects are returned randomly is 0.001 for a 
single session and the combined probability for the whole test of 36 sessions is 0.039, we 
considered this criterion as sufficient. 
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 We used non-parametric statistics to analyze the data. In particular, we compared 
the number of subjects that solved each task (sign test) and the number of sessions needed 
to discriminate color and weight (Wilcoxon test). Additionally, we assessed the effect of the 
order of task presentation and the type of stimuli on performance (Fisher’s test). Finally, we 
tested whether bonobos and orangutans differed in weight and color discrimination (Mann-
Whitney-U test). Gorillas were not included in the species comparison because of our small 
(N=2) sample size.  All tests were two-tailed. 
Results 
 Five of the 12 subjects tested performed above chance in the weight discrimination 
condition (see Table 1). They needed a median of 30 sessions (331 exchanges) to reach the 
criterion of 6 out of 6 correct exchanges. Six of the 12 apes solved the color discrimination 
with a median of 6.5 sessions (64 exchanges). The remaining subjects showed no 
improvement in performance until the end of the experiment (session 36). Only three 
subjects learned to discriminate both color and weight. A comparison of the number of 
subjects that solved color versus weight revealed no significant difference using the sign test 
(N = 3; P > 0.99). However, when all subjects were taken together as a group they seemed 
faster at discriminating color than weight (Wilcoxon test Z = -2.033; N = 12; P < 0.042). 
------------ 
Table 1 
------------ 
 Subjects learned the color discrimination in both cases - when white or black was the 
positive stimulus. Likewise weight discrimination was also learned on both instances 
independently if heavy or light was regarded to be correct. Neither the type of positive 
stimulus nor the order of presentation of conditions had a significant influence on the 
subjects´ performance in either the color discrimination task (Fisher exact tests: type, P > 
0.99; order, P > 0.99) or the weight discrimination task (Fisher exact tests: type, P = 0.072; 
order, P > 0.99). There were no significant differences in performance between bonobos and 
orangutans in either the color (Mann-Whitney U test U = 4; N = 10; P = 0.058) or weight 
discrimination conditions (Mann-Whitney U test U = 9; N = 10; P = 0.435). Because of the 
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small sample size (N = 2), the gorillas were not included in the analysis for species 
differences. One gorilla (Bebe) learned to discriminate color within seven sessions. However, 
in the weight discrimination condition she showed no improvement in performance until the 
end of the experiment (36 sessions).   
Discussion 
Some of our bonobos and orangutans learned to discriminate between differences in 
weight; however, they learned color faster than weight discrimination. We found no 
evidence of significant differences between bonobos and orangutans concerning weight 
discrimination. None of the two gorillas learned the weight discrimination task but the small 
sample size precluded a direct comparison with the other species. 
It may seem surprising that most of the subjects did not master the weight or color 
discrimination task. A lack of motivation for this outcome seems unlikely because even 
unsuccessful subjects continued to return objects at every opportunity and yet showed 
neither an increase nor a decrease in their performance over the course of the experiment.  
Similarly, a failure to understand the task is also unlikely because all subjects had been fully 
trained in the exchange procedure prior to the current study. Perhaps this result is not so 
surprising if one considers that learning to associate an arbitrary cue such as color or weight 
with a reward is not a trivial task for great apes (Call 2006). Naïve apes may take dozens of 
trials (if not more) to master a seemingly easy task such as choosing between two 
alternatives presented on a platform (Spence 1937; Jarvik 1953; Rumbaugh and Rice 1962; 
Davis and Markowitz 1978). 
Compared to previous studies, orangutans and bonobos required a much smaller 
number of sessions to reach the weight discrimination criterion than chimpanzees and 
monkeys (Klüver 1933; McCulloch 1941). This difference is also true when comparing the 
number of exchanges / trials in both sets of studies (median of 331 exchanges in our study/ 
median of 1,100 trials in Mc Culloch´s experiment). A direct comparison with the monkeys’ 
performance tested by Klüver is problematic because the author enlarged the weight 
differences until the first sign of learning occurred; however, the monkeys needed a median 
of 414.5 trials to reach an errorless performance. One possible explanation for this 
difference is that the species differed in their ability to discriminate weight. Alternatively, 
differences in the method employed in order to assess weight discrimination could explain 
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these differences. In particular, the exchange method used in the current study meant that 
no training was required to lift the objects –subjects did so within the context of the task; 
thus, the apes´ task consisted of perceiving and associating the discriminative feature that 
was associated with reinforcement. One final explanation has to do with inter-individual 
differences, which were important in our study. Such large inter-individual differences 
paired with small sample sizes could potentially explain some of the differences observed 
between studies. It is currently unclear which of these three alternatives is responsible or 
may have contributed to a greater degree to the observed differences. Future studies based 
on the exchange method, comparing the primate species included in previous studies, will 
be needed in order to tease apart these alternatives. 
We found some evidence that subjects were faster at discriminating color than 
weight. Unlike previous studies, this difference cannot be attributed to the use of different 
methodologies to test each perceptual modality. This would seem to reinforce the notion of 
a primacy of visual over kinesthetic information, at least in the case of bonobos and 
orangutans. At this point it is important to note that all of our apes were naïve to weight 
experiments but had participated earlier in experiments involving visual discrimination. This 
difference might therefore have influenced the subjects’ performance and it remains 
possible that apes would have been faster when given experience with weight before.  
Therefore, it is conceivable that the putative superiority of visual over kinesthetic cues 
reflected an effect of practice. 
A remarkable observation from the experiment should be mentioned. All subjects 
that were able to solve the weight discrimination condition started to divide the objects 
according to its weight. In particular, whenever an incorrect item was chosen (touched with 
the finger or lifted), the subjects placed it on the ground in front of them. On one instance, a 
female orangutan placed all the incorrect items in front of her on a piece of cardboard that 
she had brought with her before entering the testing room. Because an object’s weight is 
only perceived by lifting it in this study, this behavior could have been a strategy to help 
keep track of the objects that were not rewarded, thereby allowing them to distinguish 
those objects more readily from the others. On the occasions when the subjects had also 
placed correct items on the ground, we observed that they would lift each object off the 
ground until the correct item was found. However, this behavior became less frequent over 
time.  
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Although apes can sort objects into distinct groups if trained to do so (Premack 1976; 
Garcha and Ettlinger 1979; Savage-Rumbaugh 1986; Matsuzawa 1990; Spinozzi 1993; Tanaka 
1995), they rarely do so spontaneously (Tomasello and Call 1997, but see Hayes and Nissen 
1971 for a notable exception on an enculturated chimpanzee). However, in the present 
study the apes - without any specific sorting training or special rearing history - 
spontaneously separated items spatially according to weight. It is highly possible that they 
did so to keep track of the objects’ identity in the absence of any discriminative visual cues.  
This explanation is further reinforced by a similar finding on hammer selection by a capuchin 
monkey (Schrauf et al. 2008). This individual lifted the potential hammers, which were 
similar in outward appearance, and placed the heavier (most efficient) one close to him, 
often holding it with his foot. In contrast, the lighter tools were placed either back or 
sideways away from him. Schrauf et al. (2008) concluded that this advantageous strategy 
allowed the capuchin monkey to keep track of the heavy tool. Coming back to the current 
experiment, it would be interesting to see whether apes would spontaneously make 
different piles of visually undistinguishable objects based on their weight while the 
experimenter was absent, in anticipation of her returning at a later time. This would not only 
show that apes sort objects spontaneously when the situation requires them to do so but 
that they could also plan for the occurrence of future events (e.g., the arrival of the 
experimenter) - something that has been recently reported in the great apes (Mulcahy and 
Call 2006; Dufour and Sterck 2008; Osvath and Osvath 2008) and corvids (Raby et al. 2007). 
This form of planning involving the execution of a number of actions in preparation for a 
particular goal has been described as planning for action. An analogous situation has been 
reported in dolphins gathering multiple weights and placing them at a particular location in 
preparation to solve a task (Kuczaj and Walker 2006). Chimpanzees and capuchin monkeys 
have also been observed to bring nuts and tools to an anvil to crack open the nuts (Boesch 
and Boesch 1984; Visalberghi et al. 2007).  
Perhaps one of the most important contributions of this study is that it calls attention 
to the use of kinesthetic information in testing cognition in primates and other animals.  This 
is important because most studies have relied on tasks with a predominant visual 
component and less attention has been given to non-visual modalities when presenting 
problems. This is even more remarkable given the reported observations on nut-cracking in 
chimpanzees and capuchins who use weight as a key feature for the selection of hammers to 
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crack open nuts (Boesch and Boesch 1983; Visalberghi et al. 2007; Schrauf et al. 2008). Bril et 
al. (2008) reported that captive chimpanzees changed their nut-cracking behavior according 
to the weight of the hammers provided to them. Similarly, Biro et al. (2006) found that wild 
chimpanzees’ choice to use a stone as an anvil or a hammer was affected by its weight. Our 
study has shown that utilizing weight information is readily done by bonobos and 
orangutans, and that is picked up much faster than has been shown in previous studies. This 
is the prerequisite for other tasks such as hammer selection in which weight is a functional 
feature. An important distinction has to be made between the relation between weight and 
reward delivery in discrimination tasks (like the current one) and the hammer selection tasks 
(Call 2006). In discrimination tasks, weight and reward hold an arbitrary relation i.e., there is 
no reason (other than the experimenter’s choice) why ‘heavy’ should be associated with 
reward delivery. In contrast, in hammer selection tasks, there is a physico-causal reason 
(having to do with force) as to why heavy hammers are more effective than lighter ones. 
Detecting weight differences between stimuli is the first step and the prerequisite to 
presenting more complex problem-solving tasks based on a richer causal structure.  
The distinction between arbitrary and causal relations between stimuli is not 
restricted to weight appreciation (Hanus and Call 2008) but it extends to other domains 
including a naïve appreciation of solidity, gravity, and collision (Call 2004; 2007; Martin-
Ordas and Call 2009; Martin-Ordas et al. 2008; Bania et al. 2009). Most of these studies are 
based on visual information but it is conceivable that future studies will document the 
arbitrary versus causal relation in the kinesthetic modality. For instance, one could 
investigate whether subjects could infer the presence of a reward in one of two opaque cups 
based on its weight. Provided that both cups are identical and the reward is placed in one of 
the cups, the heavier of the two cups should hold the reward. One would predict that 
subjects would be much faster at solving tasks with a causal structure than an arbitrary one. 
Recently, Hanus and Call (2008) showed that chimpanzees were able to infer the location of 
a reward based on the effect that its weight had on a balance beam. Nevertheless, in this 
study the information about the effect of weight was visual rather than kinesthetic.  
The use of information about weight may not be the only kinesthetic information 
that subjects may successfully use to solve complex problems. Seed (2007) presented five 
chimpanzees with functional and non-functional trap tubes. One subject, Alexandra, 
developed a strategy in which she inspected both traps of the apparatus with her fingers 
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before responding. She started to do so after an incorrect response and continued this 
behavior after every error. Interestingly, Alexandra was the only subject that could solve the 
task. It is therefore conceivable that the chimpanzee’s good performance was influenced by 
the acquisition of tactile information. Thus, although monkeys and apes are primarily visual 
animals, other senses (e.g., tactile) also play a major role to gain relevant information from 
the environment and can be a suitable channel to pose some questions about complex 
problem solving.  
In conclusion, the current study demonstrated that bonobos and orangutans were 
sensitive to differences in weight between two otherwise identical objects. We think that 
this kinesthetic ability is of importance as the animals might apply such knowledge to 
different situations such as tool use and tool production or when making inferences about 
the physical environment. This study also showed the importance of the employed method 
to measure a certain variable. Whereas in previous studies the chimpanzees needed 
approximately 1,000 trials (McCulloch 1941) to reach criterion, the apes in our study learned 
much faster, although all of them were naïve to weight experiments. The advantage of the 
exchange paradigm was that the act needed to assess the critical property, namely, lifting 
the object, was already part of the exchange routine. Further studies in different contexts 
are needed for a better understanding as to what extent apes can make use of weight 
information and how this guides their problem-solving behavior. 
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Figure 1 Experimental set-up for the exchange experiment: Exchange objects are placed on a 
ledge inside the ape´s cage. The experimenter shows a reward that will be given to the 
subject after it has returned a correct object. (A) Ape lifts an object. (B) Ape gives an object 
to the experimenter. Drawing by Sandra Michaelis. 
 
Table 1 Participants of the exchange experiment. Numbers in bold indicate successful 
performance. Correct: Type of correct stimulus, Session: Session number in which the 
criterion (6 out of 6 correct choices) was reached. Order: Order in which the two tests were 
performed (b-w: Subjects were first tested for color and thereafter for weight, w-b vice 
versa). 
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Table 1: Participants of the exchange experiment. 
 
Species  Subject  Sex Age Color Condition Weight Condition  
     Correct Session Correct Session Order 
Orang Padana female 8 white 36 light  30* b-w 
Orang Pini female 18 black 36 light  32* b-w 
Orang Dokana female 17 black  14* heavy 36 b-w 
Orang Dunja female 33 white 36 heavy 36 w-b 
Orang Bimbo male 26 white 36 light 36 w-b 
Bonobo Joey male 23 black  29* heavy 36 b-w 
Bonobo Limbuko male 10 black  6* light  14* w-b 
Bonobo Kuno male 9 white  3* light  9* w-b 
Bonobo Ulindi female 12 white  4* heavy 35* b-w 
Bonobo Yasa female 9 black 36 heavy 36 w-b 
Gorilla Bebe female 26 black  7* heavy 36 w-b 
Gorilla Viringika female 11 black 36 heavy 36 b-w 
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Abstract 
Bonobos (Pan paniscus; n = 5), orangutans (Pongo pygmaeus abelii; n = 6) and a gorilla 
(Gorilla gorilla gorilla; n = 1) were presented with two opaque cups, one empty and one 
baited (containing two bananas). Subjects had to independently gain weight information 
about the contents of the cups to find the hidden food. Six apes attained above chance level 
within a total of 16 trials. Successful subjects spontaneously adopted the method of 
successively lifting the cups and thus comparing their weight before making a choice. Prior 
to testing, these apes had participated in a weight discrimination task. To rule out that a 
subject’s good performance was influenced by previous experience in weight experiments, 
we ran a second test in which the same task was presented to a group of chimpanzees (Pan 
troglodytes; n = 9) who were naïve to weight experiments. These subjects also participated 
in an additional test condition in which the same problem was presented based on learning 
to associate arbitrary visual stimuli. The results show that experience did not affect 
performance because, the nine naïve subjects were equally able to find the food when the 
task stimuli held a causal relation (i.e. perceived weight indicates the hidden food). 
Interestingly, only one of the naïve subjects solved the task when the task elements held an 
arbitrary relation (i.e. certain visual pattern indicates food). Our results confirm previous 
findings that apes perform better in problems grounded on causal compared to arbitrary 
relations.  
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Introduction 
Contemporary psychology often assumes that animals can learn to associate stimuli 
and responses, but possess little knowledge about the relation between observed events 
(e.g. Thorndike 1898; Povinelli 2000; Woodward 2007). Recent studies, however, show that 
the simple formation of arbitrary connections between certain events and responses is 
insufficient to explain various phenomena (e.g. Blaisdell et al., 2006; Call, 2004; Seed et al., 
2006). Seed & Call (2009) argued that certain species such as apes and corvids perceive 
functional relations between elements, and do not merely register their co-occurrence. 
Furthermore, Call (2006) noted that establishing stimuli-response associations is much 
harder when the elements of a task hold an arbitrary relation rather than a causal/functional 
relation. 
 One context in which this discrepancy has been repeatedly observed is when subjects 
have to use information from an event to infer the location of food (e.g. Call, 2004, 2006; 
Hanus & Call, 2008). For instance, Call (2004) presented great apes with two opaque 
containers and gave visual and auditory information about the content of the cups, only one 
of which contained food. When the cue and the food held a causal relation, i.e. shaking the 
cup produced either a noise or silence depending on whether there was food inside or not, 
subjects effectively used the auditory cue to find the food. In contrast, when the cue and the 
food held an arbitrary relation, i.e. tapping the cup produced the noise, subjects failed to use 
the cue to find the food. These results are remarkable given that both cues had the same 
predictive power because they always reliably indicated the presence of food.  
Sabbatini & Visalberghi (2008) replicated Call´s experiment with capuchin monkeys 
(Cebus apella), and Schmitt & Fischer (2009) tested olive baboons (Papio hamadryas anubis) 
on the same experimental paradigm. Capuchin monkeys found the food when the provided 
information derived from shaking the cups (noise or silence produced depending on 
content). However, the same subjects failed to learn to associate an arbitrary auditory cue 
with the baited container. Olive baboons were unable to use sound as a cue to find hidden 
food. Thus, Schmitt & Fischer (2008) restricted the experiment to the use of visual 
information. First, baboons were shown the content of the empty cup and, based on this 
information, they had to infer the location of the reward. Six out of 7 subjects solved this 
problem. In a second experiment, subjects were given an arbitrary cue (a red cross) as an 
indicator for the location of the reward. Interestingly, only 3 of the 7 subjects learned to 
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correctly use the arbitrary signal. This result is even more compelling because when the 
arbitrary cue experiment was conducted, the subjects already had pre-experience with the 
underlying method.  
Hanus & Call (2008) also experimentally contrasted task elements that either 
designated a causal or arbitrary relation.  Chimpanzees were confronted with a balance with 
two opaque cups mounted on either end. After the experimenter placed a piece of banana 
in one of the cups behind a screen, subjects saw the balance tipping to one side, and chose 
the lower cup significantly more often than the higher cup (causal condition). In contrast, 
subjects chose at chance when the experimenter´s action tipped the balance (non-causal 
balance condition) or when no movement of the balance was involved (non-causal wedge 
condition). Strikingly, subjects that had been choosing the lower cup in the causal condition 
reverted to random responses when the weight of the banana was no longer the cause of 
the movement. This demonstrates that chimpanzees had no intrinsic preference for the 
lower cup. Again, these findings show that chimpanzees solved the task more easily when 
the elements held a causal rather than an arbitrary relation. 
 Two aspects of studies on making inferences about food location remain to be 
investigated. First, there is the issue of the perceptual modality through which information is 
presented. In previous studies, subjects witnessed an event that produced either a visual or 
auditory outcome and then selected one of two options available. It is unclear whether 
subjects could also use kinaesthetic information such as weight for such a decision. 
Visalberghi & Néel (2003) tested capuchin monkeys’ ability to use sound and weight as cues 
to infer the fullness of a nut. The authors changed the weight of the nuts by leaving the 
nutshell either fully rewarded (original state), empty or filled with paper or lead shot. 
Capuchin monkeys could manipulate both nuts before making a choice. Those subjects 
touched the nuts and tapped them with their fingers prior to selection, potentially making 
decisions based not solely on weight, but also on sound and smell. Capuchins’ ability to use 
weight information alone has been investigated in the context of nut-cracking. Visalberghi et 
al. (2009) found that capuchins can use the weight of stones or artificial hammers (Schrauf 
et al. 2008) to decide which hammer may be more effective for cracking open nuts. 
Furthermore, Klüver (1933) showed that these monkeys can also discriminate objects based 
on their weight, regardless of their functional value, to solve a task such as nut cracking. 
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Just like capuchins, great apes can also be trained to discriminate reliably between 
objects of different weight (McCulloch 1941; Schrauf & Call 2009). Mc Culloch (1941) trained 
five chimpanzees to select the heavier of two boxes. Despite the large weight differences (80 
vs. 480g or 80 vs. 640g), the chimpanzees needed a median of 1,100 trials to master the 
task. Schrauf & Call (2009) found that orangutans and bonobos could also learn to 
discriminate objects based on their weight. In that study, subjects had to learn to exchange 
for a reward one of two identical objects that differed only in weight. Some subjects had to 
exchange the heavier objects, others the lighter objects. Apes mastered the task but 
required a median of 331 trials to exceed chance-level performance. Subjects also received 
an equivalent visual discrimination test in which they had to exchange one of two identical 
objects that differed only in achromatic color (black vs. white). Here, subjects needed a 
median of 64 trials to reach criterion; this is still a relatively large number of trials, especially 
considering that, prior to this study, subjects already had experience with the exchange task. 
Note, however, that McCulloch’s (1941) and Schrauf & Call´s (2009) study are both based on 
solving an arbitrary relation and not a causal one, the correct solution being decided a priori 
by the experimenter. 
 A second neglected aspect in food location studies is that subjects were never 
required to seek information themselves about the outcome before making a choice. In all 
previous studies, subjects were presented with a situation in which they could witness the 
end result before choosing between the two alternatives, but never produced the outcome 
themselves. It is therefore important to know whether subjects would play a more active 
role when the information is not simply provided, i.e. whether they would test and compare 
different outcomes before making a decision.  
Seeking information has been reported in studies devoted to investigating 
metacognition (e.g. Call & Carpenter, 2001; Hampton et al., 2004; Call 2010). Here, however, 
the information sought was visual, with on some instances additional auditory information 
offered (Call 2010), and did not necessarily involve making inferences because subjects could 
directly spy the food. Visalberghi & Néel (2003) also described capuchins seeking 
information, but it is unclear whether the information was about weight, sound or perhaps 
even smell. In the case of nut cracking, Visalberghi et al. (2009) observed capuchins 
comparing stones for weight and friability but here again, no inference was needed 
regarding the location of food or any other aspect of the situation. 
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 The current study therefore investigates whether subjects would seek and compare 
differential outcomes before selecting one of the two alternatives when they had access 
only to the containers weight. Moreover, we assess whether subjects learn to use weight 
more easily in a causal situation in which food presence is causally related to cup weight 
compared to an arbitrary relation as in the Schrauf & Call (2009) exchange study. The 
rationale for Experiment 1 is to test whether great apes can seek information about weight 
to infer the food location and whether subjects perform better in this context than in the 
previous weight discrimination task. Therefore, we presented apes who had already 
participated in the weight exchange study, with two opaque cups and hid slices of two 
bananas in one of them. Subjects had the possibility to lift both cups before making a choice. 
We tested whether apes would independently gain kinaesthetic information about cup 
weight and subsequently select the heavier one. If subjects learned to use weight to get the 
reward faster in this task than in the exchange task, this would suggest that subjects 
privileged the use of causal information. 
Experiment 2 was designed to examine if pre-experience in weight discrimination 
experiments influenced performance in Experiment 1. We also tested whether apes can 
learn to use an arbitrary cue to locate the food reward when the weight cue is no longer 
involved and the causal structure thus removed. For this purpose we presented the same 
task as in Experiment 1 to a group of chimpanzees who were naïve to weight experiments. 
These subjects also participated in a condition in which cups of the same weight but 
different visual appearance were presented. The cups were painted with patterns of 
different color and shape. Subjects had to learn to associate a specific pattern with reward 
location. Thus, we presented chimpanzees with causal stimuli (i.e. heaviness generated by 
food inside the cup) and arbitrary stimuli (i.e. a certain visual pattern indicates food), with 
the contingencies of reinforcement being the same. If apes solved both tasks by establishing 
arbitrary associations between stimuli (e.g. weight, colors, shapes) and reward, then they 
should learn the visual cue faster, because previous studies suggest that apes perform better 
with visual than kinesthetic cues (e.g. McCulloch, 1941; Schrauf & Call, 2009). 
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Experiment 1 
This experiment assessed the general testing procedure and examined whether 
subjects were capable of using information about weight in order to find hidden food in one 
of the two cups. 
Methods 
Subjects 
 Six orangutans (Pongo pygmaeus abelii), five bonobos (Pan paniscus) and one gorilla 
(Gorilla gorilla gorilla) housed at the Wolfgang Köhler Primate Research Centre, Leipzig Zoo 
(Germany), participated in this study. There were 8 females and 4 males ranging from 7 to 
34 years of age (Table 1). Apart from one orangutan (Kila), all subjects had been tested on 
weight discrimination prior to this study (Schrauf & Call 2009) (for a more detailed 
description, see Table 1). All apes lived in social groups with access to indoor and outdoor 
compounds. Subjects were tested individually in their indoor cages. The subjects were never 
food deprived during the experiment and water was available ad libitum. 
---------------- 
Table 1 
---------------- 
Materials 
We used two opaque white, conical, paper coffee cups (16.8 cm x 9 cm Ø top side x 6 
cm Ø bottom side) with lids (9 cm in diameter) to hide banana slices. The empty and the 
baited cups weighed 20 g and 320 g, respectively.  We attached one end of a string to the 
bottom side of each cup. A small piece of wood, which served as a stopper, was tied to the 
loose end of the string.  A Plexiglas panel with two oval openings (11.5 cm x 8.5 cm; 40 cm 
apart) on its upper part served for the presentation of the two cups (Figure 1). A small plastic 
block (5 x 2.3 x 4 cm) was attached to the Plexiglas above each opening, and the string 
passed through a slit in the block. The subjects could grasp the string through the opening in 
the panel. Pulling the string lifted the upside-down cup upwards along the panel and, as 
soon as it reached the opening, the subjects could touch the cup with their hands. The 
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opening size allowed the apes to grasp the string but prevented them from grabbing the cup. 
A grey PVC box with an opening at the back (82 x 38 x 30 cm) served to conceal the shuffling 
of the cups from the subject. 
---------------- 
Figure 1 
---------------- 
Procedure 
The experimenter (E) sat outside the cage and waited until the subject sat in front of 
the panel to start the trial.  First, the E showed the two empty cups to the ape. Then, the E 
presented a bucket filled with banana slices. E completely filled one of the cups in full view 
of the subject, whereas the other cup remained empty. The E showed the subject the empty 
bucket, covered the cups with lids and then shuffled them behind the occluder. Finally, the 
occluder was removed and the strings were passed through the block on the Plexiglas panel. 
To indicate their choice, apes had to touch one of the cups with their fingers. To do so, they 
had to grasp the string and pull it until the cup reached the opening. Only if the subject 
touched the cup we counted it as choice. Pulling the string and the cup halfway and then 
releasing it was not counted as a choice. Since holding the string and touching the cup 
required using both hands, the apes’ choices were unambiguous. After a subject made a 
choice, we unhooked the strings and showed the ape the content of both cups. If the subject 
had selected the baited cup, it received its content.  Otherwise the E put the content of the 
cup back into the bucket and left the testing room. The location of food was 
counterbalanced left and right, with the only constraint that it was not hidden in the same 
location in more than two consecutive trials. Due to the large amount of food (about two 
bananas per trial), we conducted only 1 trial per day for a total of 16 trials. 
Data scoring and analysis 
 All trials were videotaped. We used two-tailed non-parametric statistics to analyze 
the data. Our main dependent variable was the number of correct trials (e.g. the number of 
trials a subject selected the heavy cup). We compared the performance of bonobos and 
orangutans with the Mann-Whitney test. We used the Wilcoxon test to compare subjects’ 
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performance as a group to chance and to analyze whether subjects improved their 
performance between the first eight trials and the last eight trials.  We used the binomial 
test (expected p=0.5) to analyze the performance on the first trial and whether individual 
subjects selected the baited cup above chance level.  This meant that subjects had to select 
the correct cup in at least 12 out of 16 trials to be above chance levels.  We used Fisher’s test 
to assess the effect that a previous experiment on weight discrimination had on the current 
study. We also scored whether subjects compared between the two cups by successfully 
pulling both strings before making a choice.  We used Spearman correlation to investigate 
the relation between success and pulling both strings in each trial. Finally, we used Wilcoxon 
tests to compare the frequency of pulling the correct and then incorrect cup with the 
frequency of pulling the incorrect and then the correct cup. 
Results 
Success 
Bonobos performed significantly better than orangutans (Mann-Whitney U test U=4; 
N=11; P = 0.05; mean(SEM): bonobos=11.8(SEM=1); orangutans=8.3(SEM=1.6)).  All bonobos 
except one performed above chance levels, whereas only two of the six orangutans did so 
(Binomial test: P<0.05, Table 2).  Subjects as a group did not perform above chance levels 
(Wilcoxon exact test Z = 1.596; N = 12; P = 0.121).  Errors occurred mainly in the first half of 
the experiment (Trial 1-8) compared to the second half (Trial 9-16) (Wilcoxon exact test Z = 
2.223; N = 12; P = 0.03). An analysis of the first trial performance showed no initial 
preference for the heavy cup (Binomial test P = 0.388).  The type of positive stimulus 
(light/heavy) that had been associated with reward in the Schrauf and Call (2009) weight 
discrimination study did not designate success in the present study (Fisher exact test P = 
0.43).  Additionally, success in the former experiment did not determine success in the 
current one (Fisher exact test P = 0.16). 
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---------------- 
Table 2 
---------------- 
Pulling patterns 
Figure 2 presents the percent of successful trials as a function of the number of trials 
in which subjects successively pulled at both strings.  The more subjects pulled on both 
strings, the more likely they were to succeed in finding the food (Spearman correlation r(12) 
= 0.83, P = 0.001).  In the first trial, however, only Pini pulled both strings, and ended up 
selecting the empty cup. 
---------------- 
Figure 2 
---------------- 
 Figure 3 presents the mean number of trials in which subjects performed a particular 
pulling pattern.  Most responses involved a single pull that resulted in a correct or incorrect 
choice.  Moreover, there was no difference in the number of times apes chose the correct or 
incorrect cup after their first pull (Wilcoxon exact test Z = 0.359; P = 0.773). However, when 
subjects switched after their first pull, they did so more often from the incorrect cup to the 
correct cup (IC) than vice versa (CI) (Wilcoxon exact test Z = 2.673; P = 0.004).  The remaining 
cases depicted in Figure 3 were too few to enable statistical analyses, but in every case the 
apes ended up selecting the correct cup. 
---------------- 
Figure 3 
---------------- 
Discussion 
 Six of the 12 subjects tested succeeded in using the weight of the cup to find the 
hidden food. Apparently, the essential step to solve the task consisted in gaining kinaesthetic 
information about the weight of each of the cups and subsequently selecting the heavier 
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one. Successful apes spontaneously adopted the method of successive comparisons of the 
cups weight. Compared to the results of Schrauf & Call (2009), subjects showed rapid 
improvement in learning to discriminate weight even though the weight differences were 
the same in both studies. This result is even more striking because we used a novel method 
for the subjects in the present study, whereas in the earlier exchange study subjects were 
already familiar with the exchange procedure prior to testing. In the current study, subjects 
might have learned to use weight more easily because of the causal structure of the task, i.e. 
food causes weight. 
Conceivably, the apes´ good performance was influenced by their previous 
experience with weight experiments, although we detected no significant effect of their 
previous performance on the current results. Having been tested on weight discrimination 
prior to the current experiment may have made weight a more relevant dimension to them.  
Furthermore, one could argue that the fast learning was related to the large amount of food 
they received as reward. To test these alternative explanations, we ran a second experiment 
with subjects that had no previous experience on weight discrimination. Additionally, we 
introduced a second condition that, like the Schrauf & Call (2009) study, was based on an 
arbitrary (yet equally predictive) relation between the stimuli and the reward. Here, the 
causal structure was removed as an arbitrary visual cue indicated the location of the reward. 
If the abundant food promoted the fast learning, and if the task was solved by establishing 
arbitrary associations between stimuli and the presence of the reward, then the apes should 
learn the visual cue faster because previous studies suggest that they perform better with 
visual than weight cues. 
Experiment 2 
In this experiment we examined the performance of naïve chimpanzees in finding 
hidden food by using its weight (causal condition), just like in Experiment 1. We also 
investigated whether they could solve the task by using visual information (i.e. color and 
shape of stickers) as discriminative cues (arbitrary condition) when such cues were not 
produced by the presence of food. The reason for adding visual information to weight was 
because previous studies had suggested greater proficiency in visual compared to weight 
discriminations. 
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Methods 
Subjects 
Nine chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) housed at the Wolfgang Köhler Primate Research 
Centre, Leipzig Zoo (Germany), participated in this study. The seven females and two males 
ranged from 6 to 32 years of age (Table 1).  All subjects were naïve to weight experiments 
and were tested individually in their indoor cages. The subjects were never food deprived 
during the experiment and water was available ad libitum. 
Materials 
We used the same basic apparatus as in Experiment 1 including the two cups, lids and 
attached strings. For the causal condition we used two white cups, whereas in the arbitrary 
condition we used two olive green cups which differed in the color (green or blue) and 
shapes (circles vs. triangles) of the stickers that were attached to them (see Table 3 for 
information on the precise patterns used).  In the causal condition, the empty and the baited 
cups weighed 20g and 320g, respectively. In the arbitrary condition, both cups weighed the 
same after the baiting, because the empty cup was filled with a mixture of lead shot and 
silicone. Therefore, in the arbitrary condition, the weight cue was no longer involved. The 
cups in the arbitrary condition could only be discriminated by their visual appearance. To 
hide the lead shot inside the cup from the subject, we glued paper on top of it. Both cups 
therefore looked identical when they were empty and shown to the subjects. The solid mass 
formed by the silicone and lead shot distributed the weight evenly in the cup and prevented 
any rattling noise during manipulations.  
---------------- 
Table 3 
---------------- 
Procedure 
There were two conditions: causal and arbitrary. The order of condition was 
counterbalanced across subjects. The general procedure was identical to that of Experiment 
1. The only changes refer to the arbitrary condition. To make the two conditions as similar as 
possible, we placed the cups in the arbitrary condition in a grey PVC box (82 x 8.4 x 11 cm) 
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before starting a trial. Without lifting the cups, subjects were unable to see the stimuli that 
were fixed on the lower half of the cup. Thus, subjects had to lift the cup a bit in order to 
perceive the stimuli. Each chimpanzee was subjected to 16 trials per condition. 
Data scoring and analysis 
 The same scoring method and analyses as in Experiment 1 was used for the causal 
and arbitrary condition in Experiment 2. We compared the performance in the causal 
condition with the arbitrary condition using the Wilcoxon test. This test was also applied to 
compare subjects’ performance as a group to chance and to analyze whether subjects 
improved their performance between the first eight trials and the last eight trials. We used 
the binomial test (expected p=0.5) to analyze the performance on the first trial and whether 
individual subjects selected the baited cup above chance level.  This meant that subjects had 
to select the correct cup in at least 12 out of 16 trials to be above chance levels. We used 
Fisher’s test to assess the effect of order of presentation of condition. To test for species 
differences, we compared the performance of bonobos, orangutans (Experiment 1) and 
chimpanzees (Experiment 2 causal condition) using the Kruskal Wallis test. We also scored 
whether subjects compared between the two cups by successfully pulling both strings 
before making a choice.  We used Spearman correlation to investigate the relation between 
success and pulling both strings in each trial. Finally, we used Wilcoxon tests to compare the 
frequency of pulling the correct and then incorrect cup with the frequency of pulling the 
incorrect and then the correct cup. 
Results 
Success 
Subjects performed significantly better in the causal than arbitrary condition 
(Wilcoxon exact test Z = 3.728; N = 18; P < 0.001). Moreover, subjects performed above 
chance level in the causal (Wilcoxon exact test Z = 2.176; N = 9; P < 0.05) but not in the 
arbitrary condition (Wilcoxon exact test Z = 0.949; N = 9; P = 0.375). Five out of nine 
chimpanzees performed above chance levels in the causal condition (Binomial test: P<0.05, 
Table 3), whereas only one did so in the arbitrary condition (Binomial test: P<0.05, Table 3). 
The order of presentation of conditions had no influence on performance in the causal 
(Fisher exact test: P=0.318) and arbitrary condition (Fisher exact test: P=0.556).   
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Comparing the number of errors in the first half (Trial 1- 8) and second half (Trial 9 – 
16) of the experiment showed no difference for the causal (Wilcoxon exact test: Z= 1.474; N= 
9; P=0.17) or arbitrary condition (Wilcoxon exact test Z=0.954; N=9; P=0.438). In the former, 
however, only one of the successful subjects (Fifi) made errors in the second half of the 
study (Trial 15, 16) – and she did so after being correct on 10 successive trials. An analysis of 
the first trial performance showed no initial preference for either the light or heavy cup 
(Binomial test: P = 1). 
Combining the data from Experiments 1 and 2 (causal condition) showed no 
significant differences between species (Kruskal-Wallis test: χ2= 3.97; N= 20; P = 0.137; 
mean(SEM):bonobos=11.8(SEM=1),orangutans=8.3(SEM=1.6), chimpanzees=11.7(SEM=1.2). 
Pulling patterns 
Figure 4a & b show the percent of successful trials as a function of the number of 
trials in which both strings were pulled successively. The more both strings were pulled, the 
greater the success in finding the food both in the causal (Spearman correlation r(9)=0.755, 
P=0.019) and arbitrary conditions (Spearman correlation r(9)=0.777, P=0.014).  In the causal 
condition, 4 subjects compared the cups on their first trial, 3 of them ending up with the 
correct cup. In the arbitrary condition, 2 subjects compared the cups on their first trial, both 
ending up with the correct cup.  
---------------- 
Figure 4 a & b 
---------------- 
 Figure 5a presents the mean number of trials in which subjects performed a 
particular pulling pattern in the causal condition. In those cases involving a single pull (C & I), 
there was no difference in the number of times apes chose the correct or incorrect cup 
(Wilcoxon exact test Z = 1.577; P = 0.125).  However, when subjects switched after their first 
pull, they did so more often from the incorrect to the correct cup (IC) than vice versa (CI) 
(Wilcoxon exact test Z = 2.388; P = 0.016). With three exceptions, on all remaining occasions 
in which subjects compared the cups more often (two to five times), they always ended up 
selecting the correct cup. 
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---------------- 
Figure 5a 
---------------- 
 Figure 5b shows the mean number of trials in which a certain pulling pattern was 
performed in the arbitrary condition. In single pulls (C & I), apes chose the incorrect cup 
more often than the correct cup (Wilcoxon exact test Z = 2.673; P = 0.004).  When they 
switched after their first pull, they did so more often from the incorrect to the correct cup 
(IC) than vice versa (CI) (Wilcoxon exact test Z = 2.226; P = 0.031). In the remaining cases in 
which subjects switched between cups, they ultimately chose the correct cup. 
---------------- 
Figure 5b 
---------------- 
Discussion 
Five of the nine chimpanzees tested were able to find the food in the causal condition 
(i.e. food inside the cup generated perceived weight). In contrast, only one subject solved 
the task in the arbitrary condition, where visual cues indicated the correct cup.  Interestingly, 
in the causal condition naïve subjects showed a higher frequency of multiple comparisons 
per trial before making a choice than experienced subjects in Exp 1. Moreover, whereas 
experienced subjects showed a maximum of three comparisons per trial, naïve subjects 
compared the cups four and even five times per trial. The effect was opposite for the 
arbitrary condition. In particular, multiple comparisons per trial occurred less often in the 
arbitrary versus causal condition as well as compared to Experiment 1. These findings show 
that all apes react to weight cues, both those with experience in weight discrimination and 
naïve ones. However, naïve subjects were less sensitive to weight differences and thus 
compared more than experienced subjects. Because in the arbitrary condition more 
comparisons per trial do not enhance the probability to locate the hidden food, it is 
reasonable why apes compared less often in that condition.  
Subjects´ good performance in the causal condition corroborated our findings from 
Experiment 1 and clearly showed that success in the causal condition cannot be explained by 
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previous experience on weight experiments. Furthermore, when the weight cue and thus 
the causal structure was removed, subjects were unable to select the correct cup above 
chance levels even after 16 trials. Despite the visual cues, only one subject was able to solve 
the task in the arbitrary condition. This makes it unlikely that abundant food accounts for the 
fast speed of learning in the causal condition of both experiments. 
General Discussion 
Great apes were able to find hidden food in one of two opaque cups using 
information about the food´s weight. Success in this task required seeking kinaesthetic 
information about the weight of each of the cups and subsequently selecting the heavier 
one. Apes spontaneously adopted the method of successively pulling the strings and thus 
comparing weights before choosing. Unlike what we observed in Schrauf & Call (2009), 
subjects showed rapid improvement in learning to discriminate weight although the weight 
differences were the same in both studies. Whereas subjects needed a median of 331 trials 
until mastery in the weight discrimination task (Schrauf & Call 2009), here they reached 
above chance level within 16 trials. This result is even more remarkable because, when the 
exchange task in the earlier study was conducted, the subjects already had pre-experience 
with the underlying method, the only difference being the tested feature (weight). In 
contrast, the current study involved a method that was novel for the subjects.  
We presented task elements that held a logical relation, (i.e. heaviness generated by 
food inside the cup) and task elements with no logical connection between the stimuli (i.e. a 
certain visual pattern indicates food). Only one subject was able to solve the problem when 
the task elements involved arbitrary relations. Subjects that began with the causal condition 
and had successfully solved the task reverted back to chance level in the arbitrary condition. 
This result is congruent with Hanus and Call´s (2008) findings on the balance beam problem. 
In their study, chimpanzees that had chosen the lower cup in the causal condition (when 
food caused the movement) reverted back to chance when the causal structure was 
removed and arbitrary stimuli served as cue for the location of food.  
The difference in performance (causal versus arbitrary condition) and the speed of 
learning between the causal condition and the earlier weight discrimination experiment 
(Schrauf & Call 2009) can be explained by the structure of the presented tasks. The aspect of 
arbitrary and nonarbitrary relations between the cue and the food plays a major role in 
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performance.  In the causal condition of the current study, the presence of food is causally 
related to cup weight. Thus, weight is an important factor contributing to success, as the 
perceived weight indicates the hidden food. Subjects witness that a large amount of bananas 
is hidden in one of two cups and have to link the presence of food with its weight. Here, 
weight is a reliable cue because the cup with the bananas will always be heavier than the 
empty one. In contrast, in the arbitrary condition the causal structure is removed. There is 
no obvious reason for a subject why a certain visual stimuli should be correct because it is 
simply decided by the experimenter. In this arbitrary context the visual cue is unreliable a 
priori because there is no logical relation between the stimuli. Thus, subjects have to learn to 
associate a certain visual stimulus with the food location. The same effect of arbitrariness is 
evident in the earlier weight discrimination task. 
We can rule out the possibility that performance differences between conditions are 
due to weight being a more salient cue than color or shape. As Schrauf & Call (2009) showed, 
subjects learned color discrimination faster than weight discrimination. And, if one of the 
conditions had a more salient cue, then it would have been the arbitrary condition because 
individuals could rely on a certain color and/or shape. Furthermore, we can exclude that the 
abundant reward in the present study promoted learning: subjects in the arbitrary condition 
received the same amount of food, and still only one subject was able to solve the task. 
Finally, we can rule out the possibility that fast learning reflects previous experience in 
weight experiments because we ran the same experiment with a group of naïve 
chimpanzees. Even though these subjects had not been tested on weight experiments in the 
past, they also performed above chance level within a total of 16 trials. Note also that half of 
the participants in the weight conditional discrimination task had learned to respond to light 
weight as the type of positive stimulus.  
Neither subjects with weight learning experience nor naïve subjects showed an initial 
preference for the heavy or light cup in this task. After a few trials, successful apes 
introduced the method of successively pulling the strings before making a choice. Note that 
we did not present the weights consecutively, but the apes themselves found a way to 
compare the cups in sequence. The essential step to success seems to involve seeking 
information about the weight of both cups by successively comparing them before choosing. 
These findings are consistent with Klüver’s (1957) weight discrimination results with Java 
monkeys using the pulling-in technique with moveable boxes. In particular, three Java 
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monkeys were presented with two boxes of unequal weight and had to respond to the 
heavier box to get rewarded. Subjects had to pull the strings that were attached to the boxes 
to bring them within reach.  Monkeys showed no improvement in learning for a median of 
310 trials until the first appearance of the comparison behavior, i.e. the successive 
displacement of the boxes. Thereafter the errors decreased rapidly (p. 28). 
Our successful subjects started to compare the cups already after the first trial 
(Median = Trial 2). The apes determined the sequence of comparison in a given trial as well 
as the number of comparisons. After their first pull, they switched significantly more often 
from the incorrect to the correct cup than vice versa. Naïve subjects (Exp 2), however, 
showed a higher frequency of multiple comparisons per trial, before making a choice, than 
experienced subjects (Exp 1). Moreover, whereas experienced subjects showed a maximum 
of three comparisons per trial, naïve subjects compared the cups four and even five times 
per trial. A possible explanation for this difference is that experienced subjects had an 
advantage by being already more sensitive to the weight differences. When Klüver 
decreased the weight differences in his experiments from 450 g:150 g to 325 g:250 g, the 
number of comparisons subjects did per trial increased. He explained these findings by 
arguing that “the great numbers of comparisons were undoubtedly indicative of the great 
uncertainty of the monkeys (p. 62)”. This explanation is further supported by the fact that, in 
the arbitrary condition, multiple comparisons per trial occurred less often compared to the 
causal condition in Experiment 2 as well as compared to Experiment 1. In the arbitrary 
condition, more comparisons per trial did not enhance the probability to locate the hidden 
food, which may explain why apes compared less often in that condition. 
In summary, apes quickly learned to use weight information in a situation in which 
weight held a causal relation with the task solution. Subjects failed to solve the same 
problem when it was based on learning to associate arbitrary visual stimuli. Our results 
confirm previous findings (Call 2004; 2006a, b; 2007; Hanus and Call 2008) that apes perform 
better in problems grounded on causal compared to arbitrary relations.  
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Table 1 Species, name, age, sex, previous experience in weight experiments and experiment 
participation of the subjects 
 
Table 2 Participants of Experiment 1. Numbers in bold indicate successful performance. 
Weight exchange correct: type of correct stimulus in the exchange experiment. Weight 
exchange performance: Successful: subjects reached required criterion. Failure: subjects did 
not meet criterion.  
 
Table 3 Participants, pairing of presented cups and correct stimulus of Experiment 2. 
Numerals represent in how many trials subjects were correct in the respective condition. 
Numbers in bold indicate successful performance. Note that a minimum of 12/16 is 
necessary to perform above chance level. Order: order in which the two tests were 
performed (c-a: subjects were first tested in the causal and thereafter in the arbitrary 
condition, a-c: vice versa)  
 
Figure 1 Experimental set-up of the testing apparatus: Subject pulls the string to lift the cup 
towards the opening. The cups were visually identical but differed in weight. Drawing by 
Sylvio Tuepke 
 
Figure 2 Number of comparisons over the course of the experiment in relation to success for 
all subjects in Experiment 1. Primary axis: Number of trials in which subjects successively 
pulled on both strings. All pulls are considered, independent of whether subjects ended up 
with the correct or incorrect cup.  Secondary axis: Percent of correct trials. Dashed line 
indicates above chance performance (P < 0.05) 
 
Figure 3 Mean number of times subjects showed the following behavior: C= correct I= 
incorrect C or I = single pull; CI or IC = 1 comparison; CIC = 2 comparisons; ICIC = 3 
comparisons; First letter indicates the cup subjects started to pull; Last letter indicates the 
cup subjects ended up with 
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Figure 4 A causal condition; B arbitrary condition. Number of comparisons over the course of 
the experiment in relation to success for all subjects in Experiment 2. Primary axis: Number 
of trials in which subjects successively pulled on both strings. All pulls are considered, 
independent of whether subjects ended up with the correct or incorrect cup.  Secondary 
axis: Percent of correct trials. Dashed line indicates above chance performance (P < 0.05) 
 
Figure 5 A causal condition; B arbitrary condition. Mean number of times subjects showed 
the following behavior: C= correct I= incorrect C or I = single pull; CI or IC = 1 comparison; CIC 
= 2 comparisons; ICIC = 3 comparisons; CICIC= 4 comparisons; CICICI= 5 comparisons. First 
letter indicates the cup subjects started to pull; Last letter indicates the cup subjects ended 
up with 
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Species Subject Age 
(years) 
Sex Previous experience in 
weight experiments 
Experiment 
participation 
Orangutan Padana 10 F pass 1 
Orangutan Dokana 18 F fail 1 
Orangutan Pini 19 F pass 1 
Orangutan Dunja 34 F fail 1 
Orangutan Bimbo 27 M fail 1 
Orangutan Kila 7 F not tested 1 
Bonobo Joey 25 M fail 1 
Bonobo Kuno 11 M pass 1 
Bonobo Limbuko 12 M pass 1 
Bonobo Ulindi 14 F pass 1 
Bonobo Yasa 10 F fail 1 
Gorilla Viringika 12 F fail 1 
Chimpanzee Alex 7 M not tested 2 
Chimpanzee Annette 9 F not tested 2 
Chimpanzee Alexandra 9 F not tested 2 
Chimpanzee Jahaga 15 F not tested 2 
Chimpanzee Gertruida 15 F not tested 2 
Chimpanzee Fifi 15 F not tested 2 
Chimpanzee Pia 8 F not tested 2 
Chimpanzee Fraukje 32 F not tested 2 
Chimpanzee Lome 6 M not tested 2 
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Species             Subject       Performance Weight exchange 
   Correct 
stimulus 
Performance 
Orangutan Padana 12 Light Pass 
Orangutan Pini 7 Light Pass 
Orangutan Dokana 12 Heavy Fail 
Orangutan Dunja 11 Heavy Fail 
Orangutan Bimbo 5 Light Fail 
Orangutan Kila 3   Not tested 
Bonobo Joey 8 Heavy Fail 
Bonobo Limbuko 13 Light Pass 
Bonobo Kuno 12 Light Pass 
Bonobo Yasa 13 Heavy Fail 
Bonobo Ulindi 13 Heavy Pass 
Gorilla Viringika 8 Heavy Fail 
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   Condition  
Subject Pair of presented cups Correct 
stimulus 
 Arbitrary 
condition 
Causal 
condition 
Order 
Pia green Ο vs. yellow ∆ green Ο 8 9 c-a 
Fraukje blue ∆ vs. green Ο blue ∆  7 10 c-a 
Lome blue ∆ vs. green Ο blue ∆  8 8 c-a 
Jahaga blue ∆ vs. green Ο blue ∆  5 16 a-c 
Alexandra yellow Δ vs. blue Ο yellow Δ 7 14 a-c 
Fifi yellow Δ vs. blue Ο yellow Δ 6 12 c-a 
Anette green Ο vs. blue Δ green Ο 6 15 a-c 
Gertruida green Ο vs. blue Δ green Ο 8 6 a-c 
Alex blue ∆ vs. green Ο blue ∆  13 15 c-a 
    Mean 7.6 11.7  
  % correct 48 73   
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Abstract 
Previous studies (Siegler, 1981; Case, 1985) have shown that children under the age of 5-
years have little understanding of balance-scales when required to integrate information 
about both weight and distance from the fulcrum. However, an understanding based on 
weight alone is assumed to be present even in 2-year-olds (Halford et al., 2002). In all of 
these studies, weight was varied using multiple objects of the same weight. As a result, the 
children’s decisions could have been based upon visual features (size, number) without 
necessarily taking weight into account. The present study investigated whether young 
children are able to correctly encode the relevance of weight in influencing the behavior of a 
balance-scale. We studied how well 3- to 4-year-old children learn to use one of two 
different weights (of equal appearance) to tip the scale. In one condition (possible), the 
heavy weight produced the desired outcome, in the other condition (impossible), the light 
weight caused the scale to tip. Only 4-year-olds learned more effectively in the possible 
versus impossible condition, suggesting that children younger than 4 have not yet developed 
clear expectations of the role of weights on the movements of a balance-scale. 
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Introduction 
Children in all cultures have some knowledge about the physical world, generally long 
before they receive any formal education in physics. Intuitive physics is an area of research 
that studies our beliefs about physical events occurring in everyday life, predating any 
systematic theory of physics. Numerous studies have found an early competency in infants’ 
physical beliefs, suggesting that humans are innately endowed with representational 
knowledge about physical phenomena (e.g. Carey, 1985; Gelman, 1991; Keil, 1989; Leslie, 
1995; Spelke et al., 1992). In these experiments, infants are presented with a series of events 
– some that obey the laws of physics (such as solidity or gravity) and others that violate 
these laws. Several studies have shown that human infants respond differently (e.g. by 
looking longer) when there is a violation as opposed to a conformity with the physical laws 
(e.g. Baillargeon, 1995; Spelke et al., 1995) - even though they cannot translate their thinking 
into a coherent verbal account of their performance. Despite a growing body of evidence for 
an intuitive physics, however, our intuitions about physical causation are not always correct. 
There are also some deeply held intuitive misconceptions about physical phenomena, even 
in human adults (McCloskey, 1983). 
The balance-scale task belongs to the most frequently used task paradigms in 
developmental psychology to investigate certain aspects of children’s understanding of the 
physical world (Wilkening & Huber, 2002; Pauen & Wilkening, 1997; Krist et al., 2004). 
Originally introduced by Inhelder and Piaget (1958), the balance-scale task consists of a bar 
placed on top of a fulcrum or balance point. Weights can be positioned on both sides of the 
fulcrum, and the effectiveness of a weight in causing the scale to tip is determined by a 
combination of its weight and its distance from the fulcrum. The classic task has several 
variations not only involving different perceptual demands but also varying in terms of the 
types of required output. More specific, in the absence of feedback and proprioceptive 
information, children had to predict what would happen, if a balance-scale with a given 
arrangement of weights was free to move. In another variation of the task, children were 
allowed to act themselves in adjusting the objects´ distance from the fulcrum to achieve 
equilibrium of the balance.  In the 1970s and early 1980s the balance-scale task was used 
extensively to construct and investigate theories about learning and cognitive development 
in children (e.g. Inhelder & Piaget, 1958; Koslowski & Bruner, 1972; Siegler, 1976; 1978; 
1981; Case, 1985). Scientists were particularly interested in children´s understanding of the 
68 
way objects balance and whether they are able to integrate information from two different 
dimensions (weight and distance). Apart from that, the balance-scale task is also an 
assignment in which children often balance objects with considerable success, but cannot 
explain how they achieved this success (Karmiloff-Smith & Inhelder, 1974). 
Findings to date (e.g. Case, 1985; Inhelder & Piaget, 1958; Siegler, 1981; Surber & 
Gzesh, 1984) indicate that children have little understanding of the balance-scale before 5 
years of age. Case (1985) stated that children up to the age of 5 years would only be able to 
decide which side of the balance would go down when there was a gross perceptual 
difference between the two stacks of weights. Karmiloff-Smith and Inhelder (1974) stated 
that it is not until the age of 7 that children start to consider weight as a significant property 
in problems involving equilibrium; only later on are children able to differentiate between 
weight as an absolute property and weight as a force. In contrast, Halford et al. (2002) 
claimed that an initial understanding of the balance-scale based on weight alone is present 
even in 2-year-olds. 
Recently, Messer et al. (2008) argued that the discrepancy in results across different 
balance tasks may be related to children not utilizing the same cognitive processes across 
different tasks. In particular, performance appeared to be greatly influenced by perceptual 
and task characteristics. 
 Many of the previously described studies assumed that children´s initial 
representation of the elements on the beam is framed in terms of weight (e.g. Case, 1985; 
Siegler, 1978). However, in the experimental procedure on which these conclusions are 
based, an unequal number of identical elements is placed on each end of the scale to 
achieve differences in weight, rather than presenting visually identical heavy and light 
objects. Thus, number prediction pattern is confounded with weight prediction pattern.  
Metz (1993) utilized an experimental procedure in which the weight of the elements varied. 
More specifically, she presented 3-to-5-year-old children with a pan balance and a set of 
several weights that were either identical or differed in size and/or weight. Children had to 
distribute the weights across the pans to achieve equilibrium. In case the placement of 
weight resulted in disequilibrium, children could use this feedback to fix the problem. Fifteen 
of the 48 subjects tested never thought of the elements as weight, including nine 3-year-olds 
and six 4-year-olds. These children first placed the same number of elements in each pan. 
When by doing so they failed to achieve equilibrium (in some cases one element contained 
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hidden extra weight), the children tried to fix the apparatus instead of adjusting the 
placements of the weights. In particular, subjects carefully placed the apparatus in the 
correct alignment and then gently released or yanked the apparatus into the correct 
position. Based on these findings the author concluded that younger children may not 
represent the elements on the beam in terms of weight but in terms of quantity in a 
collection. In contrast, all but two 5-year-olds always assumed the relevance of weight to the 
problem of the task. 
Children as young as 2 years of age can discriminate objects by their weight 
(Robinson, 1964). It remains open, however, whether younger children are able to 
understand the relevance of weight to the balance-scale problem. If children possess 
intuitive beliefs about basic lever principles and understand how weight enters into task 
resolution, they should have an implicit expectancy about the role of weight when it comes 
to predicting the behavior of a balance-scale. Hence, children´s expectations should affect 
learning performance by reinforcing the learning of relations that are consistent with their 
prior experiences and by hindering the learning of relations that violate these expectations 
and contravene the laws of physics.  
Following this line of reasoning, the present study investigates whether young 
children (i.e. 3- to 4-year-olds) were able to correctly encode the relevance of weight in 
influencing the behavior of a balance-scale. More specifically, we studied how well children 
learn to use one of two given weights (of similar appearance) to tip a scale. We presented 
only two objects, from which children had to select one, to eliminate confounding of 
numerical, non-weight or weight representation.  
 In the causal (possible) condition, only the heavy object produced the desired effect 
of disrupting the equilibrium of the scale, while in the inverse (impossible) condition, only 
the light object was effective.  In the latter case the movements of the scale were controlled 
by the experimenter beyond the participant’s view.  The inverse condition was used to test 
whether children would learn an arbitrary association between weight and the tilting of the 
balance as quickly as a causal one.  If children possess a prior intuitive knowledge about 
weight which can be used to predict the movement of a balance-scale, they would be 
expected to perform better in the causal than in the inverse condition. 
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Method 
Participants 
Sixty children participated in this study. These children were split into three age 
groups (3, 3.5 and 4 years old), with every child’s birthday falling within a range of ± 14 days 
of their respective age class. There were 20 children in each age group, with 10 participants 
per condition. Half of the children were assigned to the causal condition and the other half 
were assigned to the inverse condition. The number of boys and girls was equal in each 
group. All participants were recruited from a list of parents who had volunteered to 
participate in child development studies. The children were tested in a child laboratory, 
which they visited with a parent for one testing session of approximately 20 minutes. None 
of the participants had any experience with a balance-scale prior to the experiment. 
Materials 
Apparatus 
The balance scale consisted of two parallel bars (76.5 cm x 3.5 cm, distance between 
them: 5.3 cm) and two fulcrums (39 cm x 18 cm and 39 cm x 24 cm, respectively, see Fig. 1). 
The scale was placed on top of a grey PVC box (85.5 cm x 55.5 cm x 42.6 cm) and presented 
to the child behind a Plexiglas panel (81.4 cm x 55 cm x 32.8 cm) to prevent children from 
yanking or aligning the scale with their hands. In the upper half of the panel were two 
openings (7 cm in diameter) through which the children could reach the balance-scale. On 
both ends of the scale’s arm, we mounted a metal dish (12 cm x 7 cm). Both dishes were 
covered with black felt so that any objects placed on top would not slide off. Whenever the 
scale was in an inclined position (irrespective of side) the uppermost dish was aligned exactly 
with one of the openings, thus allowing the child to reach through and grab the object from 
the dish. 
 The grey PVC box had an opening at the back, and two small holes were drilled 
through the board resting on top of the PVC box (see Fig. 2). We attached a transparent 
string to both arms of the balance-scale and inserted the other ends through the holes in the 
PVC board. Finally, we attached metal rings to the ends of the strings: the experimenter 
could now control the movements of the balance-scale by pulling the rings with her hands. 
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The experimenter manipulated the strings beyond the child’s view, sitting behind the 
apparatus, whereas the children were told to remain in front of the apparatus during the 
experiment. The children’s designated area was indicated by a boundary-line painted in red 
on the floor.  
---------------- 
Figure 1 
---------------- 
---------------- 
Figure 2 
---------------- 
Stimulus materials 
We used two rectangular, yellow boxes (6 cm x 5 cm x 4 cm) of identical outward 
appearance as stimulus material. One of the boxes was filled with lead shot, weighing a total 
of 320 g. The other box remained empty, weighing only 20 g. A transparent silicon paste was 
added to the lead shot to bind the contents into a solid and homogeneous mass, preventing 
any rattling noise during manipulations and evenly distributing the weight throughout the 
tool. A stuffed mouse (Lillebi) with a pink shoulder bag was used as an incentive for the 
participants. The mouse’s bag contained either a stamp or a small piece of cookie that could 
be collected by the children as a reward.   
Procedure 
After a warm-up phase the children were accompanied to the experimental room by 
their parent and two experimenters. Inside, the parent was asked to take a seat at a distance 
from the apparatus and was instructed to remain quiet during the testing session. Children 
were tested individually and were assigned to one of two groups: Group 1 received the 
causal condition (i.e. the heavy object tilted the scale) and Group 2 participated in the 
inverse condition (i.e. the light object tilted the scale). In the inverse condition, the 
experimenter prevented the tipping of the scale whenever a heavy object was used and 
produced a downward movement of the balance whenever a light object was applied. 
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 All subjects were presented with a total of 12 trials. To avoid fatigue or loss of 
motivation, a short break was introduced after the first six trials. During the break the 
children played with an apparatus that had proven to be an effective reward in previous 
experiments (Warneken & Tomasello, 2008). Here, when the child threw a cube through an 
opening in the apparatus, the cube slid down a transparent tube into a box and created a 
pleasant jingling sound. 
Demonstration 
Children received several demonstrations to better understand the mechanisms of a 
balance-scale. In addition, children themselves manipulated the apparatus by exerting 
pressure with their hands to tilt the scale. In particular, one experimenter (henceforth, E1) 
presented the balance-scale to the child.  E1 and the child walked together to the back of the 
apparatus, where E1 pulled down the upper arm of the scale with her hand and then pointed 
with her finger to the opposite side saying: “Look when this side goes down, the other side 
goes up.” This was done for both sides. Then, in a second phase, the child was asked to do 
the same. The aim of this demonstration was twofold: First, we wanted to show the children 
that pressing down one arm of the scale raises the opposite arm and, because both arms of 
the scale are connected, they will not move independently of one another. Second, we 
wanted to give the children the opportunity to feel for themselves the resistance of the 
balance when pressing down one side with their hands. These proprioceptive explorations 
fostered children´s understanding of the balance-scale. 
For the second demonstration, E1 walked with the child to the front of the apparatus. 
The child was told to watch what Experimenter 2 (E2) was doing. E2 walked behind the 
balance-scale and placed an object on one of the scale’s mounted dishes, leaving the 
opposite dish empty. This caused the balance to tip so that the side bearing the object 
touched the table.  The object was then removed, the equilibrium was restored and the 
same procedure was applied using the other dish. This demonstration was designed to show 
that, in the same manner as ones hand can press down the scale’s arm and thereby uplift 
the opposite side, the placement of elements can pull down one side and raise the opposed 
side.  
The last demonstration included the stuffed mouse that would later participate in the 
actual experiment. E1 directed the child’s attention to the balance-scale. E2 placed the 
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mouse on one dish and an object on the other. This action caused the mouse to move 
upwards into a position directly behind the opening in the Plexiglas barrier. The child was 
then allowed to take the mouse. This demonstration gave the child an opportunity to feel 
the weight of the mouse (57 g). Furthermore we wanted the child to experience retrieving 
the mouse from the dish by reaching through the opening in the Plexiglas barrier after the 
scale had been tilted.  
Experiment 
The child and E1 remained in front of the apparatus. E1 said “Now we are going to 
play a game”. E2 (behind the apparatus) showed the child the stuffed mouse with the pink 
bag. E1 asked the child “Do you see this mouse? She has just been on a journey and has 
returned with a present for you. The present is in her bag”. E2 positioned the mouse on one 
of the dishes. This tilted the scale, with the empty dish coming to rest in the upper position 
directly behind the opening in the Plexiglas barrier. E1 then showed the child two stimulus 
objects saying “I’m going to give you two objects. One in one hand and the other in the other 
hand”. Then the objects were placed in the child’s hands. ”You can place one of the objects 
on the dish to get the mouse. But only one of them”. E1 pointed to the opening where the 
empty dish was resting in the upwards position. The child was then required to place one of 
its objects on the empty dish (see Fig. 1). 
If the child’s choices were correct, then the mouse carrying the reward in her 
shoulder bag moved upwards: the child could then take the mouse from the dish, open its 
bag and obtain the reward. Placing an incorrect object on the empty dish produced no 
movement, and E1 said “Hmmh.. do you want to try it again?” 
In each trial, the position of the heavy object (in the child’s left or right hand), as well 
as the position of the mouse (on the left or right dish) was semi-randomized in the sense 
that the same side was not chosen more than twice in a row, and both sides were chosen 
equally often over all 12 trials. 
Verbal responses 
After the test session, E1 took the two stimulus objects and placed one in each of the 
child´s hands. Then the child was asked “Are the boxes the same or are they different?” If the 
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child did not reply, E1 asked “When you hold them in your hands do they feel the same? 
Why?” 
Data analysis 
All sessions were videotaped and scored from the footage. We coded the identity of 
the objects the children placed on the dishes. Our main dependent measure was the number 
of errors the children made during the experiment. 
Because the number of errors followed approximately a Poisson distribution, we 
calculated a Poisson regression (function 'glm' with family=poisson, in R, R Development 
Core Team, 2007) with condition (causal, inverse), age (3-, 3.5- and 4-year-olds) and sex as 
independent variables. We tested the significance of the interaction using a likelihood-ratio 
test comparing the deviance of the full model (including the interaction) with that of a 
reduced model (excluding the interaction). We checked for model-validity by visual 
inspection of the residuals plotted against the predicted values. This indicated no severe 
deviation from the assumption of constant variance.  
Based on the number of errors for each child, we also determined whether a given 
child was successful in solving the presented problem. We considered those children to be 
successful that chose correctly in at least 10 out of 12 trials (Binomial test: P<0.05). To test 
for a possible difference between children’s initial state versus final state, a Wilcoxon-exact-
test was used to compare the first versus second half of trials.  
Finally, we looked at children´s first trial performance to test for an initial preference 
for either the light or heavy object by using the Binomial test. 
Results 
Error analysis 
The median number of errors as a function of condition and age is depicted in Fig. 3.  
A test of the interaction between condition, age and sex revealed a significant effect on the 
children’s performance (Likelihood-ratio test: Z(1) = 3.695; P < 0.001). There was no main 
effect for age Z(1) = -1.658; P = 0.097, condition Z(1) = -0.280; P = 0.780 and sex Z(1) = 1.381; 
P = 0.167. The two-way interaction for age and condition Z(1)= 0.493; P = 0.622) and age and 
sex Z(1)=-1.330; P = 0.184 revealed no significant effect, but there was an interaction 
between condition and sex Z(1)=-3.776; P < 0.001.  
75 
As demonstrated in Fig. 3, the number of errors in the causal condition decreased as 
a function of age, whereas the opposite was true for the inverse condition. More precisely, 
in the causal condition, 4-year-old children made far fewer errors than 3- and 3.5-year-old 
children. In the inverse condition, however, 4-year-old children made more errors than the 
children in the other two age groups.  
---------------- 
Figure 3 
---------------- 
Table 1 reports the number of errors, separated for condition and age. All 4-year-old 
children who received the causal condition reached the criterion of 10/12 correct choices. In 
the inverse condition, only half of the children from the 4-year-old group reached the 
criterion. In contrast, 3- and 3.5-year-old children showed no differences in the percentage 
of successful subjects between conditions. An analysis of first trial performance showed no 
initial preference for either the light or heavy object for all age groups (3-year-olds: Binomial 
test P= 1; 3.5-year-olds: Binomial test P= 0.503; 4-year-olds: Binomial test P=0.824). 
Comparing the number of errors in the first half (Trial 1-6) and the second half (Trial 7-12) of 
the experiment revealed no difference for both conditions in the 3-year-olds (Causal 
condition: Wilcoxon-exact test Z=-0.141, P=0.984; Inverse condition: Wilcoxon-exact test Z=-
0.086, P=1). The same was true for 3.5-year-olds (Causal condition: Wilcoxon-exact test Z=-
1.638, P=0.120; Inverse condition: Wilcoxon-exact test Z=-2.236, P=0.063). In 4-year-olds, 
errors occurred mainly in the first half of the experiment compared to the second half 
(Causal condition: Wilcoxon-exact test Z=-2.646, P=0.016; Inverse condition: Wilcoxon-exact 
test Z=-2.333, P=0.031). 
With regard to gender differences, in the causal condition boys and girls performed 
similarly across all age groups. However, this was not the case for the inverse condition: 4-
year-old girls made far more errors than boys of the same age group. From a total of five 4-
year-old girls, two made 12/12 errors and only one reached criterion. In contrast, 4 out of 5 
boys in the same age class were successful. Interestingly, in the 3.5-year-old category, boys 
made more errors than girls. One boy made 12/12 errors and, whereas all 3.5-year-old girls 
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reached criterion, only two boys did so.  No sex differences in performance were found in 
the group of 3-year-old children. Boys and girls made errors to almost the same extent.  
---------------- 
Table 1 
---------------- 
Verbal responses 
Six 3-year-old children responded to E1’s questioning but none of them invoked the 
term “heavy” or “light”. In contrast, all ten 4-year-old children who answered did invoke this 
distinction (e.g. ‘this one is heavy’). In the 3.5-year-old category, 7 out of 11 children 
referred to one of the objects as heavy (or light) and 5 of those had reached the criterion of 
10/12 correct. In general, most children who responded verbally were the successful ones. 
The number of boys and girls who spoke was equal for all age classes.  
Discussion 
The children’s performance on the balance-scale task was influenced by age, 
condition and gender. We found that 3- and 3.5-year-old children performed similarly in the 
inverse and the causal condition, whereas 4-year-olds performed better in the causal than in 
the inverse condition. In fact, 4-year-olds performed better than younger children in the 
causal condition, but not in the inverse condition. Moreover, 4-year-old boys performed 
better than 4-year-old girls in the inverse condition, whereas the reverse was true for 3.5-
year-olds. 
A key finding was that, with increasing age, performance improved in the causal 
condition but decreased in the inverse condition.  The behavior of one 3.5-year-old boy and 
two 4-year-old girls in the inverse condition was particularly striking because they 
persevered in using the heavy object to tilt the balance in 12 out of 12 trials.  These children 
did not switch to the lighter object in a single trial even though the heavy object continually 
failed to produce the desired outcome. This behavior strongly indicates that children assume 
imbalance had to be caused by the object’s weight.  
Independent of age, children showed no initial preference for the heavy or light 
object. Only 4-year-old children showed significantly more errors in the first versus second 
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half of the experiment for both conditions. In the causal condition, 4-year-old children´s 
performance was unambiguous. All participants reached criterion with at most a single error 
in the first trials. In contrast, in the inverse condition we found a discrepancy in the 4-year-
old’s performance. They either solved the task without exceeding a single error in the first 
trials, or they showed no improvement over the course of the experiment, with two children 
producing even 12 out of 12 errors.   
This discrepancy implies that the ability to link the relevance of weight to the 
balance-scale task is not fully manifested even at this age class. Indeed, some 4-year-olds 
seemed to fail to understand the influence of weight on the behavior of a balance-scale, 
indicated by their willingness to learn a rule that contravenes the laws of physics, namely 
that the light object tilts the scale. 
That younger children performed equally well in both conditions (possible and 
impossible condition) might suggest that these subjects were more likely to attain the goal 
state (i.e., tilting of the scale) by focusing on the visual feedback of the apparatus then 
understanding the role of weight here. More specifically, children were sensitive to the 
feedback they received from the balance-scale and relied on this feedback in terms of 
whether the last placement had tilted the scale. Because visual feedback is iterative and 
constitutes an effective route to success in getting the reward, the children could easily 
apply this strategy. In these cases the weight of the elements functions as an object 
identifier (perceived heaviness) on a non-causal basis in the same way as color. Thus, 
children consider the unequal weights of the elements but without understanding how 
exactly it enters into task resolution. In contrast, older children go beyond responding to the 
apparatus feedback because their performance differs between conditions. They apparently 
extend their representation of felt weight to the effect of differential weights placed on the 
apparatus.  
Thus, whereas younger children seem to understand weight as felt weight (i.e. felt 
pressure while holding an object), older children considered weight as a physical property of 
objects that causally affects that object's interaction with the balance. This is indicated by 
their strikingly different performance when confronted with a situation that violates their 
initial expectations, namely that a heavy object will tilt the scale. 
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Our results confirm those of Krist et al. (2004), who presented 4-year-old children 
with either a possible event (i.e. the scale tipped down on the side bearing the larger 
number of objects) or an impossible one (i.e. the scale tipped down on the side bearing the 
smaller number of objects).  Similar to the current study, Krist et al. (2004) found more 
learners in the condition with the possible (42%) than the impossible event (24%).  However, 
more children solved the task in the current study than in Krist et al.’s (2004) study – both in 
the condition with the possible (causal) event (100%) and the condition with the impossible 
(inverse) event (50%).  Moreover, Krist et al. (2004) found that 4-year-olds needed several 
trials to master the task, whereas in our study this age group did it very quickly. One possible 
reason for these discrepancies is that Krist et al. (2004) varied the number of objects placed 
on each end of the scale rather than presenting visually identically heavy and light objects, 
as we did. As we used two boxes of similar appearance but different weight, children had to 
rely solely on their perception of the object’s weight when deciding which box should be 
placed on the scale. This difference in experimental design is important because it is crucial 
to distinguish the context of numerical, non-weight representation from weight 
representation. Several previous studies have differentiated weight in terms of the quantity 
of presented objects rather than weight per se (e.g. Case, 1985; Siegler, 1978). Thus, 
children’s decisions could therefore potentially be based on visual features (size, number) 
without needing to consider weight.  
Metz (1993) addressed this issue in investigating 3-5-year-old children’s developing 
knowledge of the pan balance. Children were presented with a balance and a set of several 
weights that were either identical or differed in size and/or weight. The task consisted in 
distributing the weights across the pans to achieve equilibrium. Younger children (3-4-year-
olds) achieved this by putting an equal number of elements in each pan. By relying on the 
apparatus feedback after their placements, they achieved the goal state. However, when 
this strategy failed (when one element contained hidden extra weight), instead of adjusting 
the weight placements, children tried to fix the apparatus by yanking and aligning it with 
their hands. Older children, in contrast, accounted for such inequality (e.g. hidden extra 
weight) by the idea of trade-offs between the number of elements in a pan and their 
respective weights. Three-year-olds never compensated between weight and number of 
discrete elements when displacing the objects across the pans to modify the beam 
alignment. Metz concluded that younger children encode the contents of each pan in terms 
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of number of elements and their relative weights.  Only 5-year-olds and some of the 4-year-
old children showed a fully elaborated weight-based approach to the task, representing the 
elements as weights and recognizing the relevance of weight to the task. 
In our study, most 4-year-olds and those 3.5-year-olds who passed the possible 
(causal) condition invoked the heavy-light distinction in their verbal responses after the test. 
Three-year-old children never used the term “heavy” when asked about the differences 
between both weights. It is unlikely that this youngest group generally lack the term 
“heavy”.  In fact, their parents reported that the children were well aware of this term and 
used it, for example in situations when they lifted large books for their parents to read to 
them, or when they helped carry the groceries. One plausible explanation is that although 
the term ‘heavy’ might be employed by children in certain situations, they may not apply it 
to others, such as in the current balance-scale task.  In other words, these children might 
appeal to the heaviness of an object to explain some manner in which the object affects 
themselves, but not as a physical property of the object itself.  
Smith et al. (1985) probed 3-to-9-year-old children’s understanding of the words 
“larger” and “heavier” on a series of paired objects. Every age group made errors by saying 
“same”, although the two cylinders were always of different weight. When the objects were 
the same size but differed in weight, especially the 3-year-olds (44%) said “same weight”. 
Only 11% of the 4-year-olds did so. 
All the above findings indicate that, with increasing age, children acquire experience 
on the influence of weight on basic lever principles. This implicit knowledge affects learning 
performance in a balance-scale task by reinforcing the learning of relations that are 
consistent with the children’s prior experiences (causal condition) and by hindering the 
learning of relations that are inconsistent with them (inverse condition). As long as children 
of a given age-range have not yet developed any rule-based knowledge to guide their 
expectations of what occurs under normal circumstances (i.e. circumstances consistent with 
the causal condition), they seem to be perfectly willing to learn a rule contradicting physical 
causality (see inverse condition). This is not the case, however, when they have already 
started to form initial beliefs. Then, they stick to their newly developed ideas and remain 
fairly resistant for some time to contradicting empirical evidence (Karmiloff-Smith & 
Inhelder, 1974).  
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In our study differences between the causal and inverse condition were not found in 
3-year-olds, but began to be seen in some 3.5-year-olds and started to become manifested 
in the 4-year-olds. Some of the older children in our sample possibly already possessed 
intuitive beliefs about basic lever principles and understood how weight enters into task 
resolution. Younger children might not have an implicit expectancy of the relevance of 
weight in predicting the behavior of a balance-scale. This is indicated by their willingness to 
learn a rule that is not in accordance with the laws of physics. Instead, they seemed to rely 
more on the visual feedback of the apparatus as a route to success.  
In conclusion, our study showed age-related differences in 3-4-year-old children’s 
understanding of weight as a cause for the movement of a balance-scale. Whereas younger 
children did not differ in their performance between causal (possible) and inverse 
(impossible) conditions, 4-year-olds performed better in the former. Our results suggest that 
younger children have not yet developed clear expectations regarding the role of weight in 
basic lever principles. 
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Table 1 Median number of errors on the balance-scale task separated for age and condition. 
Percentage of children who succeeded in the task separated for age and condition. 
 
Fig. 1. Child places one of the two given objects on the dish of the balance-scale. 
 
Fig. 2. Experimental set-up of the balance-scale task. 
 
Fig. 3. Median number of errors in 3-, 3.5- and 4-year-old children by condition 
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  Median # Errors (Range) % Successful children 
Age  N Causal Inverse Causal Inverse 
3 20 3 (0-7) 2 (0-7) 50% 70% 
3.5 20 1 (0-4) 1 (0-12) 60% 70% 
4 20 1 (0-1) 2.5  (0-12) 100% 50% 
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Zusammenfassung 
Im Laufe des letzten Jahrhunderts ist auf dem Gebiet der visuellen Fähigkeiten von Primaten 
viel Forschungsarbeit geleistet worden, von einer physiologischen (Kremers 2005) und 
kognitiven Perspektive (Tomasello & Call 1997). Im Gegensatz dazu ist über die Relevanz von 
nicht-visuellen Informationen bei Primaten wenig bekannt. Eine Vielzahl von Pflanzen und 
Früchten ändern ihre Farbe und andere visuelle Eigenschaften während des 
Reifungsprozesses nur wenig wenn überhaupt. In Anbetracht dessen, sollte die Verwendung 
anderer Sinne auch eine wichtige Rolle spielen um relevante Informationen zur 
Nahrungsmittelauswahl zu erlangen. Povinelli (2004)  vertritt die Ansicht, dass Schimpansen 
auf sichtbare Eigenschaften von Objekten angewiesen sind und kein Verständnis von nicht 
sichtbaren Objekteigenschaften wie zum Beispiel Gewicht haben. Nach der Meinung des 
Autors ist die menschliche Sprache eine wesentliche Vorbedingung um die Wahrnehmung 
von Gewicht mit einem Konzept von Gewicht zu verbinden. Im Rahmen meiner Doktorarbeit 
habe ich untersucht, ob Menschenaffen und 3-4 jährige Kinder ein Verständnis von Gewicht 
als nichtvisuelle Objekteigenschaft besitzen. Desweiteren bin ich der Frage nachgegangen, 
ob sie in der Lage sind anhand von Gewichtsinformationen Schlussfolgerungen zu ziehen. In 
der ersten Studie wurde untersucht, ob andere Menschenaffen als Schimpansen eine 
Aufgabe zur Gewichtsdiskrimination lösen können. In der Folgestudie wurden alle 
Menschenaffenarten getestet. Konkret habe ich geprüft, ob Menschenaffen 
Gewichtsinformation in einer Situation verwenden können, in welcher Gewicht in einer 
kausalen Beziehung zur Lösung der Aufgabe steht. Abschließend wollte ich untersuchen, ob 
3-4 jährige Kinder in der Lage sind die Relevanz von Gewicht als physikalische Kraft an einer 
Balkenwaage zu erkennen. Die Ergebnisse zeigen, dass Menschenaffen 
Gewichtsunterschiede von Objekten wahrnehmen können und Gewicht als Information zum 
Lösen einer kausalen Problemstellung verwenden können. Menschliche Kinder unter 4 
Jahren haben noch keine klaren Erwartungen hinsichtlich der Rolle von Gewicht auf das 
Verhalten einer Balkenwaage entwickelt. Diese Resultate legen nahe, dass die menschliche 
Sprache nicht die Vorbedingung für ein abstraktes Verständnis von Gewicht ist. 
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Abstract 
Over the last century much work has been done on the visual abilities of primates, both from 
a physiological (Kremers 2005) and cognitive perspective (Tomasello & Call 1997). In 
contrast, very little is known about the relevance of non-visual information in primates. 
Given that a variety of plants and fruits change color or other visual features only little if at 
all during maturation, other senses might also play an important role in acquiring relevant 
information for food selection. Povinelli (2004) suggested that chimpanzees rely strictly 
upon observable features and have no understanding of unobservable entities such as 
weight. In the authors opinion human language is essential to connect perception of weight 
with a concept of weight. My PhD centered on the study of great apes´ (orangutans, 
bonobos, gorillas and chimpanzees) and 3- to -4-year-old children’s understanding of weight 
as a non- visual- based object property and whether they are genuinely able to reason about 
weight. In the first experiment I evaluated how great apes, other than chimpanzees, perform 
in a weight discrimination task. In a next step I investigated whether these apes and a group 
of naive chimpanzees would be able to use weight information in a situation in which weight 
has a causal relation with the solution of the task. Finally, I wanted to assess whether 3-to-4-
year-old children are able to correctly encode the relevance of weight as a physical force in 
influencing the behavior of a balance- scale. The results showed that great apes are sensitive 
to differences in weight and can use weight information in a problem-solving task. Human 
children younger than 4 years have not yet developed clear expectations regarding the role 
of weights on the movements of a balance-scale. These findings suggest that human 
language is not mandatory for an abstract understanding of weight. 
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